AMERICA'S HIDDEN ABORTION PROBLEM
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THE NEW REPUBLIC
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THE HUMBLING OF FRANCE

Maybe America isn't so bad after all
PAUL BERMAN

The real reason behind the riots
DAVID A. BELL

France abuses itself
KEELIN McDONELL

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

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CORRESPONDENCE

JOHN BROWN'S SOUL

ALTHOUGH I APPRECIATE SEAN Wilentz's long, informed review of my book *John Brown, Abolitionist: The Man Who Killed Slavery, Sparked the Civil War, and Seeded Civil Rights*, I must register my strong disagreement with him about this key figure in U.S. history—and about history in general ("Homegrown Terrorist," October 24). Wilentz says of my book, "As history, as opposed to metaphor, eulogy, and an expression of moral certitude, this book's claims and apologies for Brown are unconvincing." Wilentz thinks, then, that "history" is far removed from language and rhetoric. But the opposite is often true; rhetoric shapes history. "All men are created equal." "Four score and seven years ago." "*Deutschland über alles*." "*Ich bin ein Berliner*." "I have a dream." Doesn't much of history stem from such potent expressions? Nations are founded on statements of moral principle. Soldiers rush into battle inspired by a metaphor, the flag. When they die, the nation is consoled by eulogy.

John Brown was both a man of action and an untutored master of anti-slavery rhetoric. His prison letters and court speeches provoked ardent eulogies and fierce denunciations. My book argues that Brown did the United States a favor by helping to force the war that ended slavery. Wilentz replies, "But ... Brown forced nothing." Actually, Brown forced a lot. Yes, the South's secession after the election of Abraham Lincoln triggered the war. But the choice of Lincoln was itself influenced by the furor over Brown. The Republicans, blamed for Brown's attack on Harpers Ferry, tried to calm matters by choosing the moderate dark horse, Lincoln. Southern extremists manipulated the panic over Harpers Ferry to add fuel to the anti-Northern frenzy that led to the splintering of Lincoln's opponents into three parties, ensuring his election and therefore bringing on secession. One might posit that a Lincoln presidency would not have existed without John Brown. Lincoln, at first preoccupied with saving the Union, denied that he was waging war to liberate slaves, declaring that "Emancipation would be equivalent to a John Brown raid, on a gigantic scale."


AMERICA'S HOMEGROWN TERRORIST AND HIS ADMIRERS
SOCIAL CONSERVATIVES: PUPPETS OR PUPPETEERS?
THE NEW REPUBLIC
THE END OF GAY CULTURE
ANDREW SULLIVAN

But is there any question that Lincoln and his generals did not, in effect, end up following Brown's lead by condoning God-ordained violence in the name of freedom? Think about Sherman's march, then reconsider Wilentz's criticism of Brown for "slaying defenseless persons for a higher political and religious cause."

Wilentz says "thousands of other Americans" contributed to civil rights. True, but only one white reformer lived continuously among blacks, penned a revised U.S. Constitution awarding them full rights, and gave his life in a violent effort to liberate the slaves. That's why the Second Niagara Movement (which became the NAACP), the forerunner of the civil rights movement, hailed Brown as one who "had no predecessors, and can have no successors." Wilentz suggests that Brown unleashed an anarchic brutality imitated by the likes of Timothy McVeigh. But my book firmly distinguishes between Brown and terrorists like McVeigh. Sometimes a social evil is so egregious, so entrenched, that violence is the only answer. For those of Brown's moral vision, American slavery—a system of oppression, torture, rape, and murder—had to be eliminated by any means. John Brown declared that slavery would end only after "*verry much* bloodshed" [sic]. Unfortunately, he was right.

DAVID S. REYNOLDS
Distinguished Professor
City University of New York
New York, New York

WILENTZ IS TOO QUICK TO DISmiss the political impact of the anti-slavery Liberty Party in the run-up to the Civil War. Although it "received only a tiny number of votes in the presidential campaigns of 1840 and 1844," the votes it received in New York in the 1844 election threw that state's electoral votes, and thereby the presidency, to Democrat James Polk, who, unlike his Whig opponent, Henry Clay, demanded—and thereafter implemented—the immediate annexation of Texas. The result was the Mexican War, whose victorious aftermath placed the ultimately irresolvable issue of slavery in the territories on the front burner of national politics. In this regard, the Liberty Party played a role much like Brown himself—it was unsuccessful in its own direct assault on slavery, but it helped engender the tangled process that would lead to the Civil War and the abolition of slavery.

HENRY D. FETTER
Los Angeles, California

WILENTZ WRITES THAT IT IS "easier to understand how [John] Brown could become such a cold-blooded killer for the Almighty" when we recognize his "patriarchal devotion to the merciless God of John Calvin and Jonathan Edwards." Surely Wilentz knows that Calvinism is distinguished by its insistent emphasis on God's grace and mercy to the undeserving. And it is no secret that Edwards was often enraptured by signs of God's merciful love, even in the fallen world of nature.

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ANOTHER "DRUG BABY" MEDIA SCARE?

By Barry Lester, PhD, Director, Infant Development Center, Women & Infants Hospital, Providence RI

Recently (July 27, 2005), Medical News Today (MNT) carried a story with the alarming title, "Single prenatal dose of meth causes birth defects." Join Together, a prominent website, published a summary of the story with a similar headline and opening with the possibly more inflammatory, "Pregnant women who use methamphetamine even once put their unborn children at risk of birth defects" (July 29, 2005). **These headlines misleadingly imply that the research involved women when it actually involved mice, and both the original story and the Join Together summary failed to mention that this animal research may have little if any bearing on the health outcome of humans prenatally exposed to methamphetamines...**

Animal research has always been critical for understanding human problems.... But there are also limits to applying animal findings to humans.

This is one of the lessons we learned from the hype that surrounded the media-created "crack baby" of the 1980s. The media was quick to report early animal studies suggesting that prenatal exposure to cocaine caused serious and irreversible defects in children. The first round of human studies also predicted dire consequences. But these studies were preliminary and flawed. The results of larger, well-controlled studies failed to find any of the serious defects or malformations shown by the early animal studies or human studies...

Nevertheless, in response to this alarmist reporting, our nation became very angry with mothers who used cocaine during pregnancy and wanted them punished for harming their unborn child. Mothers were prosecuted instead of being offered treatment, and record numbers of children were removed from their biological mothers overburdening an already overburden foster-care system...

But what does this kind of animal research tell us about human babies? That question was addressed in March 2005 by a U.S. Department of Health and Human Services expert panel reviewing the literature on methamphetamine. They concluded that this kind of mouse study -- that uses direct injection into the peritoneum -- is not relevant to humans because pregnant women don't inject the drugs they are dependent upon into the peritoneum -- the membrane that surrounds the fetuses they are carrying...

The entire article is at www.jointogether.org/y/0,2521,578073,00.html

Common Sense for Drug Policy
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Needle in a Hayestack

TRB FROM WASHINGTON

EARLIER THIS MONTH, *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* reported what seemed to be big news. In February 2002, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) had concluded that a captured Al Qaeda commander named Ibn Al Shaykh Al Libi was probably lying when he told debriefers that Saddam Hussein had provided chemical and biological weapons training to the terrorist group. Still, the newspapers reported that, even after this, the Bush administration used Libi's claims to sell the war. Colin Powell touted Libi's statements as evidence of a Saddam–Al Qaeda link in his February 2003 presentation to the United Nations; President Bush did the same in an October 2002 address to the nation.

And, yet, the news was greeted with a collective yawn. The *Times* buried its article on page A14, the *Post* on page A22. The Bush administration, meanwhile, declined to comment for either article; nor did Bush officials feel the need to address the stories in subsequent days. All of which proved that, nearly three years after the Bush administration claimed that Saddam's ties to Al Qaeda were a primary justification for the war in Iraq, no one—not even the administration itself—is now willing to seriously argue that the dictator and the terrorist group had a meaningful relationship.

Well, no one, that is, except for Stephen Hayes. Like a Japanese soldier hiding in a cave who never got the news that the emperor had surrendered, Hayes, a writer for *The Weekly Standard*, continues to fight—stubbornly insisting that Saddam did, in fact, support Al Qaeda. And, sure enough, only hours after the *Times* and the *Post* published their stories, Hayes posted a response on the *Standard*'s website. Although Hayes had once written that "al-Libi's reporting has been among the most reliable of the al Qaeda detainees," he didn't try to defend the terrorist's credibility; instead, he attacked the credibility of Michigan Senator Carl Levin, who gave newspapers the DIA memo. Why, Hayes asked, did Levin endorse the Senate report concluding that Powell's U.N. presentation was in line with the intelligence community's assessments if Levin knew that the DIA harbored doubts about Libi? The answer, as Levin told the *Post*, was that he hadn't seen the DIA memo when he signed off on the Senate report. "That's possible," Hayes allowed. "But given his history on the issue, it's also possible that Levin was simply waiting until he could be sure his claims would be most politically damaging to the administration." Alas, it's *impossible* that Levin would think that his claims would be most damaging to Bush now—as opposed to, say, 13 months ago, when Bush was running for reelection.

Granted, Hayes's notions of possibility have been warped since November 2003, when he dove headfirst down the Saddam–Al Qaeda rabbit hole with the publication of his *Standard* cover story titled "CASE CLOSED." Drawing on a leaked top-secret Pentagon memo, Hayes catalogued dozens of pieces of raw intelligence that he said demonstrated that the Saddam–Al Qaeda relationship "involved training in explosives and weapons of mass destruction, logistical support for terrorist attacks, al Qaeda training camps and safe haven in Iraq, and Iraqi financial support for al Qaeda—perhaps even for Mohamed Atta." But Hayes's article demonstrated no such thing. For one, some of the intelligence reports—like the one detailing Libi's claims—turned out to be wrong. More important, the reports showed, at the most, low-level episodic contact between Iraq and Al Qaeda. Only someone who already believed there was an "operational relationship" (in other words, someone like Hayes) would interpret the reports as proof of one. Finally, Hayes, as a journalist with access only to what he himself conceded was a " 'Cliff's notes' version of the relationship," was in no way qualified to draw such broad conclusions. As former National Security Council staffer Daniel Benjamin wrote for *Slate*, "Making a judgment about Iraq-al-Qaida ties on the basis of the sections presented by Hayes would be like accepting a high-school biology student's reading of a CAT scan."

Undeterred by such criticism, Hayes expanded the article into a book, and he has relentlessly hammered away at the topic in the *Standard*. But, as he has proved unable to change the consensus that there was no meaningful relationship between Saddam and Al Qaeda, Hayes has begun diagnosing others with his own disease. Many news outlets, he has written, suffer from "an acute case of denial." Even the 9/11 Commission—which concluded that Saddam and Al Qaeda did not have a "collaborative operational relationship"—was guilty of settling on a "predetermined storyline" that led to the "deliberate exclusion" of evidence.

Indeed, Hayes apparently feels so embattled that he is now lashing out at those who originally got him into this mess: the Bush administration. The White House has not been "making full use of the information at its disposal," Hayes recently complained. "When the president mentions Abu Musab al Zarqawi, current head of al Qaeda in Iraq, he rarely points out that Zarqawi was in Iraq before the war." (Which is true, but also irrelevant, since Zarqawi was predominantly in Northern Iraq, which was not under Iraqi government control.) And then there are the difficulties Hayes has had convincing the Pentagon to give him copies of unclassified documents discovered in postwar Iraq, which he believes might support his argument on the Saddam–Al Qaeda relationship. It's a story he told at length in a recent *Standard*—"a story," he wrote, "about the failure to explain the Iraq war."

But, if Hayes is feeling abandoned, he can take some consolation in the fact that his quackery has been a good career move. In the world of cable news, where disagreement drives ratings, the consensus about the lack of a connection between Saddam and Al Qaeda was proving to be a real obstacle when it came to producing compelling debate segments about the war. But Hayes's continued insistence on such a connection has made him an increasingly popular talking head. Need someone to argue the inarguable? Call Stephen Hayes! As a "Hardball" producer recently wrote in the daily e-mail he sends out plugging that night's show: "We'll also talk to Stephen Hayes of *The Weekly Standard* who is more convinced of the case for war with Iraq than the Bush administration." Last of the true believers is surely a better epitaph than dupe. **JASON ZENGERLE**

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

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Derailed

DAVID GUNN, WHO lost his job as CEO of Amtrak last week, kept on his desk a photograph of an old farmhouse on Cape Breton Island, Nova Scotia. It was the place to which Gunn had retired after a successful career running mass-transit systems in Philadelphia, New York, Washington, and Toronto—and from which he had been lured three years ago to save Amtrak from the brink of bankruptcy. The photo was both a reminder to Gunn and a warning to his critics: If they didn't like the job he was doing, well, he could just pack his bags and go back to Cape Breton. Now, the Bush appointees who control Amtrak's board of directors have told Gunn to do exactly that—and we are worse off for it.

Gunn had done much to put Amtrak back on the right track—he increased ridership, overhauled Amtrak's rickety financial controls, upgraded its aging railcars and locomotives, refurbished its ancient signaling technology, and started reforming its sclerotic management. And, yet, David Laney, the chairman of Amtrak's board, claimed Gunn was fired because his "enthusiasm and commitment seems to have drained away" and because he was too slow to outsource the railroad's maintenance and food-service operations.

The real problem was almost certainly that Gunn stood in the way of the Bush administration's ideologically motivated desire to liquidate the railroad. The board took a first step toward this goal in September when, over Gunn's vehement objections, it voted to split Amtrak's Northeast Corridor—the train service between Boston and Washington, D.C.—into a separate subsidiary, a move many saw as a prelude to selling it off.

Amtrak has long been a thorn in the side of conservatives, who can't stand the idea of government-subsidized rail service. "Amtrak was created to be a for-profit private corporation, but it instead went into the red by running unprofitable long-distance trains while stinting on service and maintenance for the Northeast Corridor, the route that makes the most economic sense," wrote *New York Times* columnist John Tierney, hailing Gunn's firing.

But only one-quarter of Amtrak's federal subsidy supports long-haul lines. And what Tierney and other Amtrak foes fail to note is that Amtrak maintains these routes, such as the famously unprofitable Sunset Limited from Florida to California, because Congress insists on it—the trains pass through many lawmakers' districts. As for Amtrak's underinvestment in the Northeast Corridor, again the fault lies with Congress. The legislators always appropriated Amtrak just enough money to eke by—and then complained bitterly when its belated attempt at high-speed service, Acela, failed to match the kind of bullet trains found in Europe and Japan, both of which spent tens of billions in public funds on their rail systems.



Conservatives love to decry the $29 billion that Congress has fed the company since its inception in 1971—when commercial railroads got out of the passenger business because, it should be remembered, they couldn't make money on it. But Amtrak's critics are strangely silent about the hundreds of billions in subsidies pumped into highway and air travel each year. In fact, after September 11, the airlines received a $15 billion federal bailout—and a number of carriers *still* filed for bankruptcy. Now the government is assuming responsibility for billions more to cover their pension costs. Most important, passenger rail has significant social benefits—cleaner air, less congested roads, and fewer productive hours wasted waiting in traffic or in airports—that aren't captured by these numbers.

The conservative critique of Amtrak relies on the same faulty economic logic as its attacks on Medicaid and public education. In each case, there is an essential public good—like health care for the poor, an educated workforce, or clean air—which cannot be fully expressed in dollars and cents and the provision of which makes for lousy business. Even the Northeast Corridor, Amtrak's busiest route, is not profitable when one considers the expense of maintaining the tracks and signals on which it relies. Great Britain's experience with railroad privatization should serve as a cautionary tale: After privatization in 1996, costs increased while on-time performance declined.

It's time for the Bush administration and its allies on Capitol Hill to acknowledge what a national railway really is—a public utility—and stop complaining about subsidizing it. David Gunn knew this, and his sensible reforms were increasing congressional support for Amtrak funding. Which is exactly why the administration decided to hand him a one-way ticket back to Cape Breton. ■

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{SPECIAL *"Who can save the White House?"* EDITION}

NOTEBOOK

Ever since the venerable Washington fixer Clark Clifford came to the rescue of a White House imperiled by Vietnam in 1968, presidents in trouble have turned to a unique political breed: the wise man. The wise man is a consummate Washington insider, a redwood towering above the daily political fray—a weathered veteran of past administrations and myriad crises, with a reputation for high integrity and deep sagacity. He is a revered elder who emerges from the sidelines (often a white-shoe law or lobbying firm) when the going gets tough to pen op-eds and appear on "Meet the Press," holding together the vital center and dispensing bromides about governance and the national interest. With pundits calling for a shake-up at the White House, THE NEW REPUBLIC has surveyed the field of political elders who might yet save George W. Bush's beleaguered administration.

	Qualifications	Recent activity	Public policy center	David Broder says	Potential drawbacks
JAMES BAKER 	Rescue missions include Ford '76, Reagan '84, Bush '88, Bush '92, and Western Sahara '97.	Negotiated on behalf of the Bush team in the debate about the 2004 presidential debates—ultimately securing equally sized podiums and a flashing TIME'S UP! light.	James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University.	"[T]he most capable unelected official Washington has seen in years."	Barbara Bush reportedly called Baker "The Invisible Man" for allowing her husband to make a fool of himself in his reelection campaign. The Maghreb nomads are even harsher.
HOWARD BAKER 	Former Senate majority leader; wise man chief of staff after the Iran-Contra scandal rocked the Reagan White House.	As a birthday gift, received a public policy center from the University of Tennessee.	The Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy (see left).	"[A]n island of stability in a careening world."	At 80, unclear whether that island can withstand much more careening.
LEON PANETTA	As new chief of staff, helped revive Clinton presidency in the wake of the 1994 Republican revolution.	Bucking his party by announcing support for Arnold Schwarzenegger's redistricting initiative.	The Leon & Sylvia Panetta Institute for Public Policy	"[I]ndependent-minded."	Refusal to appear on camera without PANETTA INSTITUTE sign behind him could pose White House communications challenge.
SAM NUNN 	Four-term U.S. senator, former chair of Senate Armed Services Committee.	Fighting proliferation as co-chair and CEO of the Nuclear Threat Initiative.	The Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Tech.	Knows "almost everything worth knowing about America's national security."	May be more concerned with nuclear warfare than White House defense.
DAVID GERGEN	Advised Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and Clinton.	Expressing displeasure with partisanship.	"Larry King Live"	"[E]stimable."	Could pose crisis for Bush. With "Stretch" and "Super-Stretch" taken, no nickname available for the 6'6" Gergen.

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	Qualifications	Recent activity	Public policy center	David Broder says	Potential drawbacks
KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN	According to a recent *New York Times* piece, Duberstein saved Reagan's second term by ending White House infighting, securing a U.S.-Soviet treaty, and convincing Reagan to apologize for Iran-Contra.	Writing a *New York Times* piece saying Duberstein saved Reagan's second term by ending White House infighting, securing a U.S.-Soviet treaty, and convincing Reagan to apologize for Iran-Contra.	No.	"[S]uccess in stabilizing a staggering White House removed a major barrier to Bush's election in 1988."	As a lobbyist for the Cosmetic Toiletry and Fragrance Association and the American Apparel and Footwear Association, first instinct may be to metrosexualize Bush.
CLARK CLIFFORD	Counselor to Truman, Kennedy, Johnson, Carter. As LBJ's secretary of defense, sought way out of Vietnam.	Pined for by columnist Jim Hoagland: "What George W. Bush needs right now is his own version of Clark Clifford."	No.	Among "the most impressive unelected official[s] the capital has seen."	Dead.
AL HAIG	White House chief of staff under Nixon, secretary of state under Reagan.	Host of TV show "World Business Review," which runs as paid programming on CNBC and Bravo.	No.	"E + WHE = T. Ego plus White House Experience equals Trouble."	Claimed to be "in control" when Reagan was shot, threatening the constitutional order of succession.
BOB WOODWARD 	Has cultivated Washington sources with faithfulness and tenacity that admirers describe as Rain Man–like.	White House court historian, author of book about Deep Throat.	*The Washington Post*	"... wise..."	May leak to self.
DICK MORRIS 	Often credited (by self) with rescuing Clinton's presidency. Claimed in one book to have revived the politically listless Clinton by "shaking his slack body."	Commentator on Fox News and columnist for *The Hill*. Author of approximately one book per year on the threat posed by Bill or Hillary Clinton.	Vote.com.	The dishonesty of Clinton finds its match in "the equally devious Dick Morris."	Not much liked by those who don't know him. Nor by those who do.
DEEPAK CHOPRA	Established a new life-giving paradigm of mind-body-spirit healing.	Requested that the United Nations help create a "network of networks" or "peace cells." Book-signing event in Hato Rey, Puerto Rico, at Borders Books and Music.	The Chopra Center at La Costa Resort and Spa.	"While Democrats have complained that the Bush-Chopra plan for a great Peace Ark of Irradiated Love will unfairly burden middle-class taxpayers, they also need to come up with a serious alternative." *	Jyotish counseling may not appeal to Bush's ethnocentric Western mindset.

* Or at least that's what Broder would say if he'd had a chance to write on the subject.

HOWARD BAKER: Kazuhiro Nogi/AFP Photo; LEON PANETTA: Vidal Medina/Reuters; DICK MORRIS: Nancy Kaszerman/Zuma Press; CLARK CLIFFORD: Chris Kleponis/Zuma Press; JAMES BAKER: Pamela Price/Zuma Press; DAVID GERGEN: Win McNamee/Reuters; KEN DUBERSTEIN: Peter Morgan/Reuters; SAM NUNN: G. Fabiano/Sipa Press; BOB WOODWARD: Diane L. Cohen/Gamma; DEEPAK CHOPRA: Fred Prouser/Reuters; AL HAIG: Wally McNamee/Corbis

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Liberal concerns about abortion.

Multiple Choice

BY GARANCE FRANKE-RUTA

WHEN AMY GOT pregnant during her freshman year of college, she knew that, at 18, she wasn't ready to be a mother. So she had an abortion. "That was a very easy decision to get to, but a very difficult emotional experience, both before and after," she says from San Francisco, where she now lives. "I wouldn't wish it on anyone else." Six years later, she says, she was living and working in New York City when, after a condom failure, she found herself with a second unwanted pregnancy. "That time, it was like, 'Oh, no! This sucks. Let me just take care of this.' " She had another abortion. "Oh well, that's over," she recalls thinking immediately afterward. "And then I didn't think about it very much." She didn't talk about it very much either, and, even today, she is loath to reveal it. "I rarely talk about the second abortion because of society's judgments about women who have a second abortion," she says. "It's like, 'Oh, you're allowed one mistake.' " But not two.

Amy's experience with multiple abortions was life-changing enough that she decided to volunteer at Exhale, a telephone hotline where women who have had abortions can speak openly about their experiences. Exhale, which calls itself "pro-voice," is part of a new approach to abortion that eschews dogmas, left and right. Through the organization, which went national in June, Amy counsels women like herself, some of whom have been through multiple abortions. Their numbers are growing. According to the Guttmacher Institute, an abortion-rights organization respected for its data collection, close to half of the 1.3 million abortions performed in the United States each year are repeat abortions, up from just 12 percent in 1973. Most repeat abortions are, like Amy's, a woman's second, yet the number of third abortions is not insubstantial. In 2000, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reported that 18 percent of abortions were performed on women seeking at least their third pregnancy termination. In contrast, studies have shown that rape and incest victims, the most politically sympathetic and high-profile group of abortion-seekers, account for about 1 percent of abortions.

Despite its prevalence, repeat abortion is the least discussed or researched aspect of abortion in the United States. In the past year, liberals and Democrats have increasingly focused on preventing unwanted pregnancies as a means of preventing abortion. But they have yet to address the specific needs of women who have already had abortions, partly out of fear of affirming conservative stereotypes about why women abort or how they react to an abortion. Asked about repeat abortions, a spokesman for NARAL Pro-Choice America declined several requests for comment.

Yet the reluctance of liberals and pro-choice advocates to shine a spotlight on the troubling repeat-abortion phenomenon has obscured a growing public health issue. Studies suggest that women having repeat abortions as compared with those having first-time abortions are more likely to be minorities, poor, and victims of sexual abuse—in short, among society's most vulnerable. Liberals have always sought to aid the neediest, but their fear of undermining abortion rights has paralyzed them when it comes to helping women at risk of repeat abortion. The sad fact is that, three decades after legalization, abortion is no longer mainly a tool women use to shape their own destinies, but rather a symptom of larger social problems that ought to be addressed by policymakers. Realizing this may just mean accepting that there's some credibility to conservative views on abortion.

THE U.S. ABORTION rate has declined since its peak in 1980, so that, today, only 2 percent of women between the ages of 15 and 44, or roughly 1.3 million women, have abortions each year. This is good news for liberals—especially the "safe, legal, and rare" crowd that is eager to show that the abortion rate is declining—but these numbers also conceal a meaningful demographic shift. In 1973, the majority of American women who obtained abortions were white and childless. Since then, tremendous advances in birth control options—coupled with an upsurge in condom use in response to the AIDS epidemic, approval of the morning-after pill, and anti–teen pregnancy programs—have contributed to an overall decline in abortions, especially among the very young women most likely to have sought abortions in the past. Defying the pregnant-teen stereotype, only 19 percent of women getting abortions in 2000 were adolescents, according to Guttmacher, down from 33 percent in 1972.

But the trends aren't quite so propitious for other groups of women. While the overall U.S. abortion rate declined between 1994 and 2000 for nearly all population groups, it continued to rise among low-income women and women on Medicaid. And a growing proportion of women getting abortions are members of a minority group. During that same time period, the abortion rate fell 20 percent among white women but only 10 percent among Latinas and 8 percent among black women. Although they account for roughly 30 percent of the population, minorities represented fully 59 percent of women getting abortions in 2000. In contrast to the mostly childless women getting abortions in the '70s, 60 percent of women getting abortions today are already mothers. If the goal is to decrease

Garance Franke-Ruta is a senior editor at THE AMERICAN PROSPECT.

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abortion rates, then the social and medical changes driving today's lower overall abortion rate are leaving these women behind.

The whole point of defending abortion rights is so women can have control over their own destinies. The data, however, clearly show that a lot of women getting abortions are doing so precisely because they *don't* have control over their destinies, and perhaps never did. What few studies there have been of women who have repeat abortions paint a particularly disturbing picture. Rather than being the free choice of a woman controlling her own fate, repeat abortion operates as a kind of surrogate marker in women's lives for many other things that have gone awry.

A Canadian study of 1,145 women found that those getting repeat abortions in 1998–1999 were much more likely to have a history of sexual or physical abuse. "Presentation for abortion," the researchers concluded, "may be an important indication to screen for a current or past history of relationship violence or sexual abuse." Repeat patients were less likely to report they had "lots of friends" and "lots of plans for the future," and they reported significant conflict with their current partners.

Given these realities, it is high time that pro-choice advocates and their political defenders begin to treat abortion as a public health issue, rather than just a philosophical or political problem. Pro-choice advocates argue that women need the fail-safe of legal abortion in order to be free. Pro-life groups argue that the recriminalization of abortion will force women and men to become more sexually conservative and socially traditional, to their mutual benefit. But what women who abort appear to really need is the kind of help and social support that neither side has been willing to give them.

THE GREAT IRONY is that the reluctance to address repeat abortions has caused U.S. private sector abortion services to lag behind those offered elsewhere in the world. Since 1993, the leading international family planning and women's health groups have been trying to address the repeat abortion problem under the auspices of the Postabortion Care Consortium. The Consortium was motivated by concerns about unsafe abortions, among other things. The U.S. Agency for International Development works closely with the Consortium and has funded programs aimed, in part, to reduce repeat abortions in Turkey, Egypt, Russia, and several African and Latin American nations. The World Health Organization has advocated post-abortion care and counseling since 1991, and support for it was written into the 1995 U.N. Fourth World Conference on Women Platform for Action.

Though U.S. abortion services are much safer from a medical standpoint, it's time to consider whether secular post-abortion care and counseling services ought to be made available domestically as a routine part of women's health care as well. Such services could help women who abort gain control of their lives after abortion, get linked up with an appropriate form of birth control, and—most importantly—avoid descending into crisis once again.

Advocates brave enough to take on this subject will find broad support for it in the medical literature. A 1997 Guttmacher study recommended that "more intensive contraceptive counseling and services should be provided to first-time abortion patients who are young" or otherwise at high risk of repeat abortion. The Canadians who recommended screening for sexual or physical abuse posited that "such screening could result in offers for referral and counseling that might prove helpful to the woman ... and could potentially help avert a future abortion."

There are some post-abortion services available already in the United States, though the efforts are mostly piecemeal. Atlanta's Feminist Women's Health Center, one of the oldest abortion providers in the country, offers a shot of the long-acting hormonal contraceptive Depo-Provera and post-abortion counseling to all women who obtain procedures there. Planned Parenthood also has begun to offer post-abortion counseling services at some of its clinics, and it has long made sure that all women who leave their standard post-abortion follow-up visit are provided with a form of birth control.

But such efforts clearly have not been enough, and there has been little research into how to most effectively prevent repeat abortions. Indeed, it could reasonably be argued that providing poor women with job-training and life-counseling after abortion might do as much to reduce repeat abortions as providing birth control. Reaching out to men with post-abortion counseling and contraceptive information might also make a difference. Partly because they are older, women who get repeat abortions are less likely to be single, and one study at a Baltimore hospital found that one-third of women were accompanied to their abortion by the man who had impregnated them. If such men are "not included in counseling in any way, it constitutes a missed opportunity to reduce repeat abortions," Stan Becker, a professor at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and a study author, said when it was released in 2004. More research into what kinds of contraception are best for post-abortion women would also be beneficial. The high rate of daily birth control pill use reported among women seeking repeat abortions, for example, suggests that this method may be less effective for them than the weekly patch or Depo-Provera.

Polarization on abortion has kept those who defend a woman's right to choose silent on this issue. But pro-choice liberals must protect women from the poverty and abuse that often lead to abortion as fiercely as they protect the procedure itself. The growth of groups like Exhale shows that women who have had abortions need to be able to talk honestly about their experiences, including repeat abortion. Three decades after *Roe* v. *Wade*, liberals should still follow women's leads. ■

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Trading land for peace.

Swap Meet

BY UZI ARAD

FOR 70 YEARS, efforts to devise a fair and durable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute have centered on the question of how to partition the land between the two peoples. There have always been maximalists who wanted dominion over the entire area. But, over the years—from the Peel and United Nations commissions in the 1930s and 1940s to the Oslo process and the road map in the last decade—partition, or a "two-state solution," has become the internationally accepted key to the dispute's resolution. This guiding principle has received additional support in the wake of the second intifada, whose violent attacks have disabused many Israelis of the idea that they can co-exist with the Palestinians in a single state.

Only some Palestinians and their hard-core supporters in Europe and the United States retain maximalist tendencies. The natural growth rates of the Palestinian population (almost double those of the Jews) spurred Palestinian support for a one-state solution—a secular democratic state, dominated by the Palestinians because of their sheer numbers, with Jews as a minority. But this will not happen. The legitimacy of a Jewish state, with a Jewish majority, has been supported by the international community for almost 100 years, and Israel will fight to preserve its existence as such. It is precisely to maintain its Jewish and democratic character that Israel is willing to withdraw from more than 90 percent of the West Bank, despite the security interests that warrant keeping those areas, as well as the profound attachment that Israelis have to these parts of their patrimony.

Today, most Israelis and the international community back the two-state solution. The necessity—in fact, the inevitability—of partition has drawn its strength from the observable fact that both the Jewish and the Palestinian societies are bent on exercising as well as advancing their distinct identities to the point of national self-determination. Embedded in the partition concept, therefore, is the cultural and ethnic divide between the two peoples. By now, even most Palestinians—who, in previous decades, rejected a two-state solution—have recently come to accept the formula.

During the last decades, plans for implementing partition have given rise to the mechanism of land swaps, meaning the exchange of sovereignty over territories without the physical transfer of populations. All land-swap plans use the 1949 armistice lines—which divided the British Mandate territories west of the Jordan River between Israel and the Arabs—as a starting point. Their appeal lies in demographic developments that have created settlements that are nearly uni-ethnic. Geographically, these blocs are situated in such a way that they could be attached either to Israel or to a Palestinian state. The various land swap plans proposing a tradeoff of territories aim to increase ethnic homogeneity and to preserve each side's basic territorial reach. In this context, land swaps allow an exchange of sovereignty over contiguous population blocs—Jewish population blocs in the West Bank proximate to the armistice line and Arab population blocs west and north of the armistice line. For example, the Gush Etzion and Ariel blocs and towns in the Jerusalem district could be exchanged for the towns and surroundings of Umm El Fahm, Arara, Bartaa, Qalansuwa, Taybe, Tira, and Kfar Kassem.

A land-swap plan must be part of a final status agreement between Palestine and Israel. Indeed, it appears that, without such territorial exchanges, a final agreement may not be reachable.

AMONG THE GEOGRAPHERS and demographers who have put forward various proposals for land swaps is Professor Gideon Biger of Tel Aviv University. In 1996, Biger proposed creating two states—one wholly Jewish, the other wholly Arab—by annexing to the Palestinian state the "triangle area" from Kfar Kassem in the south to Bartaa in the north, along with their populations. In return, the Palestinians would transfer to Israel some areas in the Jordan Valley. Biger also considered population transfers without land exchanges, allowing Jews in the West Bank to resettle in Israel in return for Israeli Arabs and Bedouins living in the Galilee and Negev to settle in Palestine.

The most outspoken Israeli advocate of land exchanges has been Haifa University's Arnon Soffer. Like Biger, Soffer proposed that, as part of a final settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, 450,000 Arabs now living under Israeli sovereignty—particularly the Arabs of East Jerusalem and the Arabs of the "triangle"—be placed under Palestinian sovereignty without having to leave their homes.

Of course, for Israelis, an important gauge of a land swap's utility is its demographic impact. In 2003, Sergio Della Pergola of Hebrew University advocated Soffer's idea after calculating its likely long-term effect on the Jews' majority in Israel. According to his study, even after Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and Gaza, Jews would comprise 79 percent of the population in 2010, 77 percent in 2020, and 74 percent in 2050. In other words, Israel would retain a solid yet receding Jewish majority well into the second half of this century. But, by performing Soffer's land swap, the Jewish majority would remain at 81 percent until 2050. In other words, the land swap

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has great potential to preserve Israel as both a Jewish and a democratic state well into the latter half of this century.

The concept of territorial exchange as a basis for a viable, long-lasting settlement has essentially become consensual in Israel, at times explicitly and at times implicitly. This is true across the Israeli political spectrum—left, center, and right—with the exclusion of anti-Zionist groups. It should therefore be no surprise that senior politicians like former Minister of Infrastructure Avigdor Lieberman (from the political right) and former Minister of Transportation Ephraim Sneh (from the left) both endorse these proposals. Retired Admiral Ami Ayalon, former head of the Israeli Security Agency, claimed that a six-point program he negotiated with Palestinian Professor Sari Nusseibeh contains the kind of flexibility that would allow for mutually agreed land exchanges of the kind proposed above. In a less explicit and public manner, both Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and his predecessor, Ehud Barak, seriously examined this option but probably deferred their explicit support for the negotiating process.

Land swaps have become an imperative element in almost every final status proposal. In December 2000, for example, President Bill Clinton set forth what is widely considered the most authoritative set of principles for a future bilateral partition between Israel and Palestine. He said that the Palestinian state should include somewhere between 94 and 96 percent of the West Bank, with a land swap of 1 to 3 percent and other territorial arrangements to compensate for the land Israel would annex for its settlement blocs. Clinton also said that any deal should allow Israel to annex 80 percent of Jewish West Bank settlers in blocs, preserve territorial contiguity for both sides, and minimize the number of affected Palestinians.

Some Palestinians believe that such a land swap would have meaningful benefits for them: They would receive Arab Jerusalem and could resettle refugees closer to their native land. Members of the Palestinian Authority have been open to the possibility of a deal along such lines, arguing privately that it should be part of a final-status agreement. They believe that, if such a package were to be accompanied by adequate economic incentives, it would become a plausible option.

But not all Palestinians currently living in Israel (the Israeli Arabs) want to be in Palestine—an objection that presents a serious moral challenge. Public opinion polls in Israel's Arab community show that only about one-third support land swaps and that most Israeli Arab leaders oppose the idea. Some polls appearing in the Israeli-Arab press suggested that the majority of Israeli Arabs would like to see Israel alter its constitutional foundations and evolve into a binational state, erasing most of its Jewish character. This sentiment is particularly strong in those towns destined for exchange under the land-swap proposal. Recent surveys have shown that almost half of the Arab Israeli residents in those areas oppose Israel's continued existence as a Jewish and democratic state, and a significant number of them espouse fiercely radical Islamic ideology.



Given this kind of pronounced Palestinian nationalism and the deep ideological, religious, and political alienation from Israel, territorial exchanges would not only achieve greater ethnic and cultural homogeneity in the two states, but they would also enhance their political stability. Proud Palestinian nationalists now living in Israel could manifest their identity as citizens of their own state. Some counter that Israeli Arabs would prefer the democratic virtues of the Jewish state to Palestine. But one should not ignore the trend toward democracy in the Palestinian territories. In fact, the world community has made clear that Palestinian statehood should be bestowed only when the state is viably democratic.

Others argue that, faced with the possibility of economic hardship under Palestinian sovereignty, Israeli Arabs would invoke their Israeli citizenship and relocate to the Jewish state. That argument cynical-

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ly assumes that economic benefits would lead Arabs, who so frequently and vociferously express a deep attachment to their native towns and villages, to cavalierly pack up and move to predominantly Jewish areas. Moreover, it would undercut the Arab argument for refugees' "right of return." Any land swap would likely allow Israeli Arabs assuming Palestinian sovereignty to keep whatever social welfare benefits they had as Israeli citizens, and compensation would probably be offered to offset the costs of the transition. Thus, there might actually be an economic disadvantage to staying in Israel. At present, Israeli Arabs are exempted from military or national service—a substantial economic benefit. Following a final status agreement, however, Israel is much more likely to insist that all its citizens genuinely enjoy and fulfill the state's rights and obligations, including military service.

In addition to the bilateral land-swap plans, another plan calls for multilateral land swaps between Israel, the Palestinians, and Egypt. Hebrew University's former rector, the geographer Yehoshua Ben-Arieh, has proposed that Israel transfer to Egypt some 200 to 500 square kilometers in the Negev contiguous to the Sinai Peninsula, along with a corridor across the Negev, creating a land bridge between Egypt and Jordan. In return, Egypt would transfer to the Palestinians an area twice the size of the northern Sinai, contiguous to the Gaza strip, significantly increasing the territory of one of the most densely populated areas in the world. In turn, the Palestinians would agree to Israeli sovereignty over areas in the West Bank of commensurate magnitude. The latter would include not only the contiguous Jerusalem neighborhoods and settlement blocs, but also additional territory with no Palestinian inhabitants along the Jordan River, on nature reserves in the Judean desert, and on the Dead Sea shore.

The primary advantage of this wider land-swap deal is that it would enhance the economic and social viability of the Gaza Strip and allow Israel to keep a greater portion of the West Bank. Palestinians and Israelis would benefit significantly from such an exchange. Senior American, European, and Middle Eastern officials have all expressed interest in the idea, though Egypt has indicated that it is not yet ready to consider this proposal. A final settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute still requires much work and will take some time. By then, hopefully, Egypt will embrace such flexibility, which would greatly benefit the Palestinians and further its own quest for regional power.

It is therefore now—when people are looking beyond the disengagement plan and when much thought is being given to where this process should lead—that a land swap conceding Palestinian towns contiguous to the West Bank to the future Palestinian state should be given serious consideration. Whether in their bilateral forms or their expanded multilateral forms, the land-swap formulas should no longer be dealt with as though they were the hidden agenda of one party or the semi-official plan of another; rather, they should be treated as an operational option whose time has come. ■

Mahfouz Abu Turk/Reuters

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Zarqa Dispatch

Base Jump

BY ELI LAKE

THE CHILDHOOD MOSQUE of Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, the Jordanian terrorist who has emerged as the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, is a modest affair. It lacks a proper minaret, and, unlike many of the other houses of worship in this hardscrabble industrial city, there are no green or blue neon lights to set it off from the corner bodegas and concrete apartments nearby. Last Friday, though, this one-story concrete building suddenly found itself on the front lines of an ideological war within Islam.

The imam here at the Al Falah Mosque, Mustafa Suleiman, dedicated his sermon that day to how the bombings two days earlier of the Grand Hyatt Hotel, Days Inn, and Radisson SAS Hotel in downtown Amman, just 45 minutes away, were criminal and contradicted the strictures of Islam. "Zarqawi is *kufr*," Suleiman says when asked his opinion of this city's most notorious son. *Kufr* is a serious charge in Islam; it literally means blasphemy. But, in the lexicon of sacred terrorism, *kufr* refers to a class of people to whom Islamic laws do not apply—who can be cheated, robbed, and killed without penalty from God.

For Suleiman, declaring Zarqawi and those who agree with his jihad *kufr* means that they are no longer part of the community. He tells me that, in light of last Wednesday's attacks, he will no longer allow Zarqa's Salafis, the ascetic sect of Islam to which Zarqawi nominally belongs, to pray at his mosque. He has urged his flock to cooperate with Jordan's secret police, who have fanned out over the city. He says, "Nobody can be pleased with Zarqawi's actions, but his family, which still attends prayers at the mosque, is especially ashamed. We don't support him here. We don't support him in Iraq." And, at least for the mosques in Zarqa, this view is not unique. Closer to the city's center, the imam at the much larger Abu Gaud Mosque says that Zarqawi's Islam is "poisoning the minds of our young people."

In fact, across Jordan, the response was much the same. A survey conducted the weekend after the attacks by Amman's *Al Ghad* newspaper found that 86.4 percent of Jordanians polled think that Al Qaeda is not acting in accordance with the tenets of Islam. Less than 1 percent believed the attacks were in the interest of the Arab cause. Zarqawi crossed an important line when he sent his martyrs to the center of an Arab capital. This time, their victims were, for the most part, not Americans, Iraqi Shia, Jews, or Turks; they were the same Arab Sunni Muslims that Al Qaeda in Iraq claims to be defending.

Zarqawi, it seems, made a strategic mistake in attacking Amman's hotels. His tactics may ultimately alienate the very people he hopes to convert to his cause. The Amman bombings prompted the imams of Zarqa to confront what Jordan's government has traditionally been loath to admit: Radicalism and sympathy for Zarqawi's atrocities in Iraq have been tolerated in Jordan for too long. But now, thanks to Zarqawi's own plots, that is starting to change.

ZARQA IS TO Amman what Oakland is to San Francisco. While Amman sparkles at night with sleek modern towers and bustles during the day with the business of the kingdom, Zarqa's working-class residents slog away in a less glamorous economy. King Hussein built this place in the middle of the last century to host a Jordanian army barracks, and it has since grown into the country's second-largest city, with nearly one million people working mainly at textile factories, power plants, and oil refineries. In Amman, it seems that every third driver has pasted a Jordanian flag or a picture of the king in his window. Here, there is hardly any of this spontaneous patriotism. The few flags on houses and apartment buildings are Palestinian. The only visible soldiers on duty here guard a distillery, the target of occasional protest from the city's more pious citizens. In Amman, it is hard to find a single block downtown without an armed security officer.

Until Zarqawi's organization murdered USAID official Laurence Foley in Amman in 2002, Zarqa was known mostly for a particularly tasty version of the national dish, mansef—a mixture of lamb, yogurt, and rice—and its cheap clothing shops, which advertise their wares in banners strung above traffic in the city's merchant district. Today, Zarqa seems forever linked with the man who sent a husband and wife strapped with explosives to blow up a Jordanian-Palestinian wedding.

Zarqawi was born Ahmed Fadeel Al Khalayleh in 1966 to a poor family in this poor city. According to Ibrahim Gharaibeh, a Jordanian author who has written extensively on Islamic terrorism, Zarqawi's father, who is now dead, went through long spells of unemployment. His mother died in 2002. By all local accounts, Zarqawi was a bad apple, but he displayed leadership skills. He was a captain of his local soccer team. In the mid-'80s, he was known for his reckless behavior. "He drank a lot," one man who claims to be a distant cousin tells me. Gharaibeh says that, in 1985, Zarqawi, who had worked as a street sweeper, was arrested for stealing. But he did not become a radical Muslim until he left for Afghanistan in 1989, just as the Soviets were pulling out. Upon his return to Jordan, he became part of a small network that was broken up by the Jordanian security services in the early '90s. Zarqawi was sent to prison in the southern part of the country. "The problem began in the prison," Gharaibeh says. "Abu Musab has

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charisma. With his previous experience from Afghanistan, he became a leader in the prison." Gharaibeh estimates that Zarqawi persuaded around 100 prisoners to join his organization while behind bars. Suleiman says that Zarqawi was released after his family appealed to the offices of King Hussein.

For Suleiman, it is a point of shame that this terrorist's nom de guerre is a constant reminder of his city. And that is why he has set out to preach against Zarqawi's actions. Nonetheless, the imam and his fellow religious leaders have a long way to go. Even though Zarqawi's group has essentially claimed responsibility for the triple bombings, many people here still refuse to believe it. Outside of a modest concrete house, which I am told by a local merchant belongs to Zarqawi's brother, six teenage boys start an argument about the attacks of last Wednesday. "Do you really know who did this?" a lanky boy who calls himself Ahmad asks. I respond that Zarqawi's organization took credit for the attacks on websites. "You can't believe anything on the Internet," he says. "I think there is a hidden hand." It's not hard to find that sentiment here. In interviews, I encounter every possible explanation for what the Jordanians find inexplicable. Some speculate it was the Israelis; others say it was Shia from Iran. One mechanic even says he could see King Abdullah approving the bombings to generate sympathy.

But the disbelief is also telling. I met no one who bought Al Qaeda in Iraq's own justifications for the bombings—namely that the monarchy was too close to the CIA and the new Iraqi government and therefore deserved the mayhem its martyrs wrought. It's easy to understand why. At the Grand Hyatt Hotel, Mustafa Akkad, a beloved Syrian-born filmmaker best known for a movie he made about Libya's resistance to Italian rule, and his daughter died in the blast. Also killed in that bombing was Major General Bashir Nafeh, a senior Palestinian intelligence official. As a monument to the atrocities, the Radisson SAS Hotel has left in place the wreckage of the Jordanian-Palestinian wedding that ended with the murder of the groom's and bride's fathers.

JORDAN'S MINISTER FOR religious affairs, Abdul Salam Al Abadi, denies that the country is a breeding ground for extremism. "Our mosques are not suffering from inciting terror, except for a few exceptions that we deal with on a case-by-case basis," he says. But many in Jordan are starting to see things differently. Says Ayman Safadi, the editor of *Al Ghad*: "We have tolerated the voices here who justify and apologize for the killing in Iraq. But this era has ended."

Back in Zarqa, a student named Yasir Yemeni tells me over sweet tea that he and his friends are in solidarity with the victims of the hotel bombings. "The people who died in Amman, we consider our friends," he says. "We don't want to even know anyone who would do something like this." That ought to remind Zarqawi of something he seems to have forgotten—or never learned: All politics is local, even in his hometown. ■

Why the French forgot how to assimilate.

The Shorn Identity

BY DAVID A. BELL

TO THE SMOKE rising from the Paris suburbs, the American press has been adding a generous portion of fog. Typical was the front-page story in last Friday's *New York Times*. A "significant proportion of the population," Craig S. Smith wrote, "has yet to accept the increasingly multiethnic makeup of the nation. Put simply, being French, for many people, remains a baguette-and-beret affair." Put simply, this is distressingly close to nonsense, and not just because berets have been far more scarce on French streets than baseball caps for many years. What Smith and the many American journalists who have repeated such ideas for the last few weeks have not reported is that France has been a multiethnic country for a very long time, and, for decades, it did as well as any other Western country—including the United States—at integrating large numbers of immigrants into its society. The problem that has literally burst into flames this year is not that France has an innate inability to integrate ethnic groups, but rather that its method for integrating them no longer works.

TO SEE THE multiethnic history of modern France, one need look no further than the phone book of any major French city. In addition to the Duponts and the Lebruns, and names of Arab and African origin, there are long columns of Cohens and Kowalskis, of Chungs and Nguyens, of Martinis and Gonzalezes and Oliveiras. It has been estimated that roughly a quarter of French citizens today have at least one foreign-born grandparent. In the years between World War I and

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1965, during which the United States radically curtailed immigration, France took in a considerably higher proportion of immigrants than we did.

Nor did most of these immigrant groups experience more prejudice than their American equivalents. (The Jewish community, mostly descended from nineteenth- and twentieth-century immigrants, constituted the glaring exception; the pro-Nazi Vichy regime sent 76,000 Jews to the death camps.) Today, throughout the highest ranks of French society, men and women of immigrant descent are anything but uncommon. Nicolas Sarkozy, the tough-talking interior minister and likely 2007 presidential candidate, is the son of a Hungarian immigrant on one side and the grandson of a Greek Jewish one on the other. Pierre Bérégovoy, a Socialist prime minister in the 1990s, was of recent Ukrainian descent. That great icon of French cinema, Yves Montand, was born in Italy as Ivo Livi. Jacques Derrida, France's most famous philosopher of the late twentieth century, was an Algerian Jew.

Furthermore, France's ability to accept and integrate new ethnic groups has not entirely ceased to function in recent decades. Just minutes from central Paris, areas like Belleville and Porte d'Ivry are home to hundreds of thousands of French citizens of southeast Asian descent, who have remained almost entirely removed from the recent disturbances. In part thanks to these immigrants, tiny Asian carryouts have become as common as bakeries in many parts of the city in recent years, suggesting that, if "baguettes" remain central to French identity, it may only be because the word also means "chopsticks." In recent years, Asian surnames appear to have become increasingly common among the students admitted to France's elite institutions of higher education, the *grandes écoles*. For that matter, a steady stream of ethnic North Africans has also been rising into the French middle class, their successes overshadowed by the larger problems of the suburbs.

Admittedly, until recently, this history of immigration had been relatively invisible. Unlike in the United States, immigrant heritage has never functioned as a source of French national pride. There is no French equivalent to the Ellis Island museum, no French holiday like Saint Patrick's Day. Artists and writers from the older immigrant groups have not, for the most part, injected an ostentatiously ethnic flavor into their works. There is no French-Jewish Philip Roth or Woody Allen. And, for this reason, the French themselves long remained largely ignorant of their own history, to the point that, as late as 1986, one of the country's best and most prominent historians, Pierre Nora (himself, ironically, of Jewish descent) could speak of large-scale immigration as "a novelty of the country's present-day situation." The leading French authority on immigration, Gérard Noiriel, had to struggle long and hard just to have his subject recognized as a legitimate one within French academia. But, since the publication of his path-breaking book *Le creuset français* (*The French Melting Pot*) in 1988, there has been an explosion of studies, hobbled only by the stubborn refusal of the French state to compile statistics on the country's racial and ethnic composition.

Nicolas Sarkozy, the French Interior Minister tasked with controlling the riots, is himself the child of immigrants.



PIERRE ANDRIEU/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

THIS REFUSAL—THE official denial that ethnicity can have any legitimate place in public life—reflects the republican ideology that lies behind France's model of immigration. Republicanism resolutely opposes any show of loyalty to an entity other than the nation itself, whether an ethnic group, a geographical area (such as a French province), or a religion. As long ago as 1789, a legislator memorably articulated the key idea in regard to the group that, until very recently, was seen as most different from the French norm, and around which discussions of ethnic difference tended to crystallize: "Everything must be refused to the Jews as a Nation ... and everything granted to the Jews as individuals." In recent years, the most ferocious debates over French identity have not concerned immigrant groups, per se, but Islam, and particularly the wearing of headscarves by Muslim girls in the public schools, which the French state has banned. To dedicated republicans, the headscarf is precisely the sort of badge of identity that threatens

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THE FUTURE OF FREE TRADE

Some U.S. firms don't have the same footing as foreign companies

On Nov. 10, 2005, a panel of trade experts was assembled by *The New Republic* to discuss the impact of free-trade agreements on countries around the globe. Panelists noted that it is both the best of times and the worst of times for free trade. Growth in trade continues, sharply in major markets such as India and China, as well as in new ones. At the same time, bilateral trade agreements are being stalled in the Americas and multi-lateral agreements through the World Trade Organization are more difficult to negotiate. And finally, American business must wade through a whole host of post-9/11 security precautions on trade. The following is an edited transcript:

THE PANEL

SUSAN ESSERMAN
Former Deputy U.S. Trade Representative

PAULA MURPHY
Director, Massachusetts Export Center

MODERATED BY

JEREMY KAHN
Managing Editor, *The New Republic*

JEREMY KAHN: It's sort of the best of times and the worst of times for free trade. In absolute terms, the flows of goods and services between countries have never been greater, and the level of trade continues to grow each year, as reflected in our record-high trade deficits here in the United States. And yet, at the same time, these are not auspicious times for the political support for free trade, either here or domestically or abroad. The free-trade consensus that once existed as recently as five years ago in Washington, D.C., seems to have collapsed to some extent. It certainly seems to be fraying on the left, and on the right you saw that the president was barely able to get [the Central American Free Trade Agreement] ratified earlier this year, and I think you'll see continued problems with trade issues. There is considerable debate about whether the president will get fast-track authority reauthorized in 2007.

And meanwhile, abroad the news is mostly bad. We seem to go from one sort of free-trade disaster to another. Cancun ended in disaster. The Doha Round seems terribly stalled, and just recently the Summit of Americas [is] more like the nadir of trade rather than a summit. So I think it's a very interesting time, one that's filled with both promise and peril. Susan?

SUSAN ESSERMAN: The [World Trade Organization] has been vital to our ability to achieve trade reform on a global scale, and it's pretty basic as to why, and that is because the members of the WTO cover 97 percent of world trade, and with the new countries about to join the WTO — Saudi Arabia, Vietnam and Russia — the WTO is going to account for almost all of the trade and all of the trading partners of consequence. Free-trade agreements [have] been very, very popular in recent years, including in the [United States], and they can be important in achieving concrete gains. Generally they cover a very small amount of trade, and sometimes they're not even free-trade agreements; they're managed-trade agreements. So the WTO is really important if we want to broadly achieve trade reform [and] get rid of trade barriers affecting many, many countries.

The Hong Kong mistrial conference was supposed to be this pivotal meeting in which the formula was going to be agreed on for how we were going to go about reforming agriculture services and industrial goods trade. Now, in quite a dramatic announcement, the United States and the [European Union] indicated they were just not going to meet the goal, and I think — having been involved in some of these fairly spectacular negotiating summits — what they were really trying to avoid was another big, spectacular public relations debacle for the WTO, because you had Cancun and Seattle, and I think the concern was that we need to lower expectations now.

So I think not a whole lot is going to happen in Hong Kong. It's going to delay the negotiations. And I think we're courting disaster here because there is a deadline by which we really must complete the negotiations, and that is early 2007. And the reason for that is that we have a special fast-track authority under which trade agreements are approved by the U.S. Congress. And the reason why it's an important procedure for trade agreements is that they go through Congress with an up and down vote, [with] no amendments. It's crucial if we're going to get a free-trade agreement passed, and our fast-track authority expires in 2007.

I [want] to give a sense of why it's becoming so incredibly difficult to negotiate these free-trade agreements. First, today, unlike in the past, the WTO consists of 149 members. And the WTO operates on the principle of consensus. That means you've got to get every country agreeing before you can reach an agreement. It's getting very, very difficult to operate with this many members under the current structure of the WTO, and I think we really need to look seriously at that. Long gone are the days when

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the [United States] and the [European Union] controlled everything. If we agreed, the rest of the world would follow. Today, the leading developing countries have taken center stage. They have demanded a far bigger voice in the round, and they claim that past negotiations and past agreements have to be rebalanced. And in fact, as a condition for launching this current global round, they have demanded that they get special and differential treatment, and that was infused throughout the legal document that launched the round.

So this is very much reflected in the demands and the negotiating proposals, and most recently this week, India, as a great leader on this point, reminded us that they want to have delivery on the promise that they get special treatment. That means they're entitled to special concessions from other trading partners and they don't have to give in a symmetrical manner.

The rise of the developing countries has really changed the power alliances in the round and it's really dramatically changed their expectation. And you can see this in a lot of the different coalitions, in the failed Cancun meeting.

So you've got the rise of the developing countries and these expectations, and then you have another interesting development, and that is since the round was launched, you have, in a very visible way, China and India integrating into the global economy, with quite visible effects in countries around the world — [the United States and the European Union] — but also in Latin America. And so you see in the [United States] a real anxiety about the impact of these countries on our industrial base and for the first time in our high-paying service sector, and that in turn feeds into skepticism about free trade.

With these recent developments, with the recent failed meetings, with some of these competing or conflicting forces underlying the WTO, I think some raise the question, is the world trading system the proper vehicle for achieving reform? I think it's premature to be saying that we should throw the WTO out. After all, as I said at the outset, it's the only vehicle for achieving *reform on a global scale. So my view is* we need to go back and look at how we're negotiating these agreements, and at a minimum, we've got to think about whether a different approach is in order.

PAULA MURPHY: My office, the Massachusetts Export Center, is a government agency. We work with businesses to help them export their products and services internationally through counseling, technical assistance, international market research, and we also work with some other government agencies to actually promote exports overseas by introducing U.S. businesses to overseas buyers, customers through trade shows and matchmaking and things like that. And my presentation today is going to be focusing on the importance of global markets to local businesses and real-world challenges that companies face when they're exporting their products and services internationally.

Accessibility to export markets is of paramount importance to Massachusetts businesses. Last year Massachusetts exported approximately $22 billion worth of manufactured goods overseas, and exports account for roughly 25 percent of the state's manufacturing employment. The same trend holds true on the national level. Exports accounted for [approximately] 215 percent of U.S. economic growth during the last decade and supported an estimated 12 million American jobs.

Susan Esserman:
"WE NEED TO GO BACK AND LOOK AT HOW WE'RE NEGOTIATING THESE [FREE-TRADE] AGREEMENTS, AND AT A MINIMUM, WE'VE GOT TO THINK ABOUT WHETHER A DIFFERENT APPROACH IS IN ORDER."

Although the government hasn't figured [out] a way of tracking service exports as of yet, we do know that our service industries also have benefited tremendously from export markets. Foreign patients are receiving treatment at our local hospitals. Foreign students are studying at our local universities in record numbers, and engineering, consulting and financial service firms are doing tremendous business overseas. Many of our clients' export sales account for 50 percent or more of their total sales, so for these firms, their ability to export is directly tied to their ability to succeed and survive.

In addition, out of necessity, most U.S. firms no longer hold off on targeting overseas markets until their U.S. market is saturated. Many firms are born exporters today because they recognize that many foreign markets are just as important, and in many cases more important than their domestic U.S. market. And, contrary to popular belief, exporting is not just for large businesses. In fact, the vast majority of exporters in the [United States] are small businesses. Small business accounts for 97 percent of the U.S. exporting population and is responsible for one-third of the value of U.S. exports. Small businesses also accounted for 98 percent of the export population growth in the [United States] over the past 10 years.

The spread of free trade already has fueled significant growth in U.S. exports and will continue to present opportunities for U.S. businesses. While Massachusetts still considers countries like Canada, Germany, Japan and the [United Kingdom] among its largest export markets, the strongest growth is coming from the emerging markets of the world.

Massachusetts' exports to China grew [more than] 100 percent over the last two years, and countries [such as] India, Thailand, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt are rapidly growing markets for Massachusetts' products. And so far this year, our exports to Saudi Arabia [from Massachusetts] are up almost 50 percent.

With these opportunities come challenges, however. Trade barriers continue to threaten the competitiveness of U.S. businesses overseas.

Currently there are approximately 10 different U.S. government agencies that are responsible for various aspects of export controls. If an exporter is to be compliant for any given export sale, they must check their foreign customer against five different lists maintained by three different agencies. So you can imagine this is a tremendous task for a company that's making several export sales a day.

Many exporters need to perform license checks for controlled products. What constitutes a controlled product? Items as benign as cameras, laptop computers, plastic handcuffs, and thousands of other prod-

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ucts are controlled. If a company does need an export license, they will need to wait anywhere from a couple of weeks to a couple of months for approval, and in today's competitive global environment, a wait this long can constitute a lost sale. Moreover, there is little support to help companies comply with these regulations. So organizations such as mine, which are supposed to be promoting U.S. exports, often are held back by having to help companies navigate the system.

U.S. firms already are at a disadvantage over their foreign counterparts when it comes to government support. Yes, there are cases where foreign governments directly subsidize exporters, but the reality is far more subtle. U.S. firms are competing head-to-head with foreign firms that are assisted by very well-funded and very aggressive government trade organizations. The U.S. policy has been to minimize investment in this area, and current indicators point to significant budget cuts and trade promotion for the future.

Of course there are a host of other issues faced by U.S. firms in foreign markets: the inability to repatriate funds in many emerging markets, excessive foreign government standards and regulations, laws that put U.S. exporters at risk of having to make payouts to poorly performing distributors. The challenges are everywhere. Some of these might be accepted risks for doing business internationally. Others, however, will require intervention to create a fair and level playing field for all.

MODERATOR: Given the fact that India, as you say, Susan, has been insisting on special and deferential treatment, and yet providing that treatment was essential, in many cases, to getting developing countries to sign up to the WTO. And, Paula, given what you're saying about the problems that Massachusetts exporters face when they go overseas, in terms of intellectual property rights, in terms of competing on a level playing field, in retrospect was it a mistake to have granted special deferential treatment in all of these cases?

MURPHY: Well, we haven't done it yet. While "special and deferential" treatment — which means that developing countries don't have to give as extensive commitments as the developed countries — is I think very appropriate for the poorest countries in the world, no question, and we should do everything we can to try to bring these countries into the trading system.

I think the big question is, if you've got India and Brazil or China being so successful in the world economy and having themselves huge markets which are so important to the companies that Paula mentioned, if they want access — unfettered access to our country — shouldn't they have to provide serious access to their own country? So the difficulty is that if the United States, or Europe, or any country, is expected to make serious concessions, to lay open their market completely, they've got to show their exporters they're going to get something in return. Otherwise there will not be political support or support in the country for moving ahead with these negotiations.

So my answer is maybe that it's easier to launch around and say development is important; we're going to give special and deferential treatment, but when you have to sign on the dotted line, make a concrete agreement, it becomes very difficult because the Indians certainly think we must deliver fully across all negotiation and give them special treatment and all of the other developing countries special treatment. And I think the answer really is that not all developing countries should be treated the same.

Paula Murphy:
"U.S. FIRMS ARE COMPETING HEAD-TO-HEAD WITH FOREIGN FIRMS THAT ARE ASSISTED BY VERY WELL- FUNDED AND VERY AGGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT TRADE ORGANIZATIONS."

ESSERMAN: I would certainly agree with that. I am not the best person to talk about the intricacies of the WTO agreement, the negotiations and things, but from the perspective of businesses that want to access these markets, especially places like China and India, we have very savvy exporters that we're working with. These are companies that are exporting to 30, 40, 50 countries around the world — they know what they're doing — and they still can't figure out China. And that's one of the reasons we had to form the China Business Council, because of these challenges. And so there needs to be some way of making sure that the environment is created for companies to succeed over there, and when you are talking countries like that, there is no reason they shouldn't be.

MODERATOR: You said maybe it's time to stop proceeding multilaterally on all fronts in these grand rounds. Some people were saying, well, forget that — forget the WTO altogether and go back to a system in which you do bilateral deals. You can do them faster, you can access the markets in some cases you want to access; you don't get the same countries forming alliances in the same way, and the developing world ganging up on the developed world, for instance, or vice versa.

So some people say, well, why not go back to a bilateral system, and I imagine if you're a Massachusetts exporter, does it really matter to you if the trade agreement you're operating under was negotiated bilaterally or multilaterally, and so why not go back to sort of a bilateral system?

ESSERMAN: I think it is premature to be suggesting we don't go back to the WTO, because it is, first of all, more efficient to achieve reform through one agreement and get common terms. So, for example, your companies will face the same terms across all countries. The free-trade agreements can be important, and I think [the North American Free Trade Agreement] was a terrific free-trade agreement in the sense that it was a comprehensive free-trade agreement.

We have, though, since 2000, concluded or are negotiating 22 free-trade agreements. Do you know how much trade it affects? Nine percent. The WTO affects 97 percent, and soon nearly 100 percent, of world trade.

And the other thing you have to think about is that free-trade agreements are proliferating around the world. I think, interestingly, the [United States] started it with NAFTA and then they were not able to proceed politically for some time. Europe went crazy — many, many free-trade agreements. Even countries such as Japan, which had

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never, ever negotiated outside the multilateral system, are busy with their free-trade agreements.

MURPHY: I would agree with that as well. Many of the companies we're exporting — while it's wonderful that we have all of these new free-trade agreements on the horizon that have been recently developed, those really aren't the high-volume markets that most of the companies we're helping are exporting to.

And, as Susan mentioned, with free-trade agreements comes an increased burden of proof for companies that are exporting, so it's actually more paperwork for them to export under a free-trade agreement than it is to not export under a free-trade agreement, and they have to prove that their produce qualifies for the rule of origin for that specific agreement, and it creates more confusion. And it's beneficial but it can be kind of a pain in the neck.

MODERATOR: That brings up an interesting point. You both work with companies that are trying to enter new markets. And Paula mentioned there's a ton of bureaucracy on the U.S. side that is problematic, and, Susan, you may have encountered this as well with your clients. If there was a single-biggest reform that you would like to see the U.S. government institute in terms of helping companies export, what would it be?

MURPHY: On my side it would absolutely be streamlining the export regulatory process, decreasing the export regulator burden and providing some support to help companies comply with those regulations, because companies are getting fined and there is no way that some of these violations can, in some cases, be very easy to make.

ESSERMAN: I would agree 100 percent with Paula. The myriad of export-control regulations is just hard to believe. There is the State Department, the Treasury Department, the Commerce Department; in some cases, if you get into criminal prosecution, the Justice Department. It is very, very difficult to deal with.

No. 2, the regulations are impenetrable. They are not written in English. And so it is very hard for businessmen to read and understand in good faith the extent of their application. You see, I think that's one of the interesting developments in recent years. The export-control regulations have been with us for some time, but with the increased concern about security generally, I think there are a host of regulations that our companies now face, both relating to exports and otherwise, and I think that puts the United States in a different position than many other countries today.

(Moderator turns to the audience for questions)

QUESTION: Would you say that there is still hope for free trade and for this agreement to take place between the United States and Latin American countries, and if so, what would be the next step toward going back to those discussions and trying to open up those trade agreements?

Susan Esserman:
"I THINK THERE ARE A HOST OF REGULATIONS THAT OUR COMPANIES NOW FACE, BOTH RELATING TO EXPORTS AND OTHERWISE, AND I THINK THAT PUTS THE UNITED STATES IN A DIFFERENT POSITION THAN MANY OTHER COUNTRIES TODAY."

ESSERMAN: At this juncture, the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, the 34-country agreement really is on life support, and the reason for that is that Brazil, the largest economy in the region, has not wanted to move on it. So that is a serious problem. And until that changes, it is going to be very, very hard to move forward.

So what the strategy of the Bush administration has been is to negotiate free-trade agreements with individual countries or with groups of countries until they have got agreements with as many of the Latin countries as possible. And I do think that is a smart thing to do.

QUESTION: There has been a lot of criticism of the so-called Washington consensus and the position on financial liberalization. I was wondering what your views are on that.

ESSERMAN: A lot of people cite the Washington consensus as being misplaced when it comes to trade in Latin America. I really don't buy that. I think trade would help Latin America a great deal. But there are so many other issues that really come into play in terms of why their economies are not doing so well.

As to the financial liberalization, interestingly, some of the countries that did not open up quickly and were not affected by the financial crisis, such as India, feel they were quite right and smart to be taking a much more gradual approach to it.

MODERATOR: Paula, I know there are several large financial services companies [in Massachusetts]. Is there much pressure for financial services liberalization in terms of trade financial services?

MURPHY: I think there is. It's actually not an industry that we do much with because many of the companies are larger companies and really have been able to find success on their own. But definitely the people like Fidelity, and Mass Financial, and Investors Bank and Trust are doing a lot overseas and want to expand.

MODERATOR: I want to thank both Susan and Paula for being with us today. It was a really interesting discussion.

To view the complete transcript from the event online go to:
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

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AFTER MANY DECADES, THE U.S.-SAUDI FRIENDSHIP IS STRONGER THAN EVER

Relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States are based on mutual respect and common interests — economic, political, technological and social. The deep and abiding friendship between the two nations *began almost a century ago.*

A VERY PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP

In 1919, King Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud — who founded the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Sept. 23, 1932 — was attracted to the ideals of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, particularly his call for self-determination.

King Abdulaziz viewed the United States as an emerging global power that, unlike the European nations, had no colonial ambitions.

His view was enhanced by Americans he met, such as philanthropist Charles R. Crane, who helped establish the first desalination plant to supply drinking water to Jeddah, and geologist Karl Twitchell, who discovered oil in the Kingdom while exploring for underground water aquifers.

The United States was a valued partner in Saudi Arabia's early exploration for oil. Standard Oil of California (Socal) won the first concession on July 7, 1933. On Nov. 7, 1933, diplomatic relations were established between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

The bilateral ties established in 1933 were formalized in 1942 when the U.S. government opened its first legation in Jeddah. Two years later, in 1944, the first Saudi Arabian legation was established in the United States.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt clearly understood the Kingdom's geopolitical importance. On Feb. 14, 1945, the meeting between Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz aboard the USS Quincy in the Great Bitter Lake of the Suez Canal heralded a new chapter in Saudi-U.S. relations. The two men, who had previously written to each other and exchanged opinions on world affairs, spent long hours discussing a wide range of issues, particularly the future of Palestine, which was under British mandate at the time.

"THE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UNITED STATES EXTENDS NOT ONLY TO THE PUBLIC SECTOR, BUT ALSO AMONG ORDINARY CITIZENS."

The friendship between the two countries flourished thereafter, and ever since that historic meeting, every Saudi head of government has met with a sitting U.S. president.

The most recent Saudi leader to visit the United States was King (then Crown Prince) Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, who was a guest of President George W. Bush at his ranch in Crawford, Texas, on April 25, 2005. King Abdullah had made an earlier state visit to the Crawford ranch in April 2002 and visited with President Bill Clinton at the White House in September 1998.

The partnership between Saudi Arabia and the United States extends not only to the public sector, but also among ordinary citizens. Hundreds of thousands of Americans have lived and worked in Saudi Arabia. More than 500,000 Saudis have studied in the United States, and many of the members of the current Council of Ministers hold degrees from American universities.

A BUSINESS FRIENDSHIP

Saudi Arabia turned to the United States for assistance as it embarked on an ambitious development program in industry, agriculture, health care and education. American companies and experts were therefore involved in building up the country's modern infrastructure.

The United States became Saudi Arabia's principal trading partner, and has remained so for more than half a century, exporting to it billions of dollars worth of goods and services every year, while importing from the Kingdom a sizeable portion — averaging approximately 15 percent — of its crude oil needs.

The rapid growth as a result of the close commercial and economic relationship between the two countries is reflected in the increase in two-way trade from $56.2 million in 1950 to more than $25 billion in 2004.

The Saudi Arabian-U.S. Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation was set up in 1974 to provide advice on technical and planning matters to expand business activity, and in 1994 the U.S.-Saudi Arabian Business Council was established. An organization of business leaders from the two countries, its mandate is to be the focal point for the exchange of knowledge between the Saudi and U.S. private sectors and to encourage joint ventures.

The largest joint venture undertaken to date was launched in June 2001 when the Supreme Council for Petroleum and Mineral Affairs endorsed the concept of signing agreements with American and European oil companies for major investments in the oil and gas sector. Three pivotal investment projects were identified. ExxonMobil Corp.

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is involved in two of them, and ConocoPhillips Inc. in the third, along with Royal Dutch/Shell, British Petroleum Co., Phillips Petroleum Co., Occidental Petroleum Corp. and Marathon Oil Corp.

THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE

In the 1950s and 1960s, Saudi Arabia and the United States shared the view that communism was the primary threat. With the Middle East and North Africa mired in revolutions and coups, the Soviet Union loomed as a real threat to the region.

In the early 1980s, relations between the two countries entered a new and closer phase in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution, the taking of American hostages by Iranian revolutionaries, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and threatened to attack Saudi Arabia, King Fahd and President George H. W. Bush led a diplomatic campaign to forge a coalition of Arab, Muslim, European and other nations to confront Iraq and free Kuwait. In November of that year, King Fahd received former President Bush in Riyadh to discuss ongoing efforts to reverse the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.

The main threat to regional peace and stability over the past half-century, however, has been the Arab-Israeli conflict and the two wars it spawned in 1967 and 1973. Every Saudi ruler since King Abdulaziz has championed the rights of the Palestinians for a homeland and self-determination based on the principle of "land for peace," as articulated in U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 388.

The Arab initiative for peace proposed by King Abdullah and endorsed for a second time at the Arab Summit in Algiers in March 2005 echoes the "roadmap" of the United States and calls for an independent State of Palestine side by side with the State of Israel.

PARTNERS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM

The most recent example of the close relationship between the two nations has been in the War on Terrorism. Saudi Arabia reacted promptly in condemning the tragic events of Sept. 11, 2001, and supported the subsequent U.S. military action in Afghanistan. The two countries are working closely to defeat the evil of terrorism.

When the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States issued its report in July 2004, Saudi Arabia welcomed the findings, which unequivocally stated that the government of Saudi Arabia was not complicit in or connected in any way to the 9/11 attacks.

"WHEN THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES ISSUED ITS REPORT IN JULY 2004, SAUDI ARABIA WELCOMED THE FINDINGS, WHICH UNEQUIVOCALLY STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA WAS NOT COMPLICIT IN OR CONNECTED IN ANY WAY TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS."

Meanwhile, al Qaeda activity in the Kingdom had escalated. Attacks on housing complexes and government buildings affected Saudi nationals, as well as foreign residents. In 2003, Saudi Arabia and the United States set up two joint task forces, one to deal with terrorist attacks, and the other to provide financial oversight of potential terrorist funding. Working together, these task forces are succeeding in eradicating a scourge that has affected both countries.

"THE KINGDOM'S ACCESSION TO THE [WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION] WILL BENEFIT U.S. MANUFACTURING AND SERVICE INDUSTRIES, AGRICULTURE AND AMERICAN WORKERS BY PROVIDING INCREASED ACCESS TO THE KINGDOM'S GROWING MARKETS."

THE FUTURE OF THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP

On Sept. 9, 2005, Saudi Arabia completed a bilateral market access agreement with the United States, which allowed the Kingdom to proceed with a bid for accession to the World Trade Organization.

Playing a part in the adoption of the bilateral agreement are the new systems and regulations that have been issued in the Kingdom in the areas of investment, commerce, finance and economics, such as laws governing the protection of the rights of intellectual property.

On Nov. 11, 2005, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was approved to become the 149th member of the WTO at a meeting of the WTO's General Council in Geneva, Switzerland, where Saudi Minister of Commerce and Industry Hashim Al-Yamani signed accession documentation on behalf of the Kingdom.

Saudi Arabia's membership will officially take effect 30 days following the signing, which will allow the Kingdom to participate in the WTO's ministerial summit in Hong Kong in December.

Accession to the WTO will help promote diversity in Saudi Arabia's growing economy and open employment opportunities for the Kingdom's young people, as well as encourage foreign investment. The Kingdom's accession to the WTO will benefit U.S. manufacturing and service industries, agriculture and American workers by providing increased access to the Kingdom's growing markets.

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to trump one's identity as a citizen and endanger civic unity.

To understand why the republican model of integration has begun to fail over the past 40 years or so, a bit of older history is necessary. The model dates all the way back to the French Revolution. Large-scale immigration had not yet begun in the late eighteenth century, but, even so, France was perceived as dangerously divided among its own constituent populations. The diversity of language was most striking. By some estimates, less than one-fifth of the population spoke standard French with any degree of fluency; the rest spoke a congeries of local tongues, including Breton, Basque, the southern French language Occitan, and regional dialects of French itself. It was hardly surprising that the great revolutionary orator Mirabeau referred to France as an "unconstituted aggregate of disunited peoples."

To create a cohesive political community, the most radical revolutionaries believed that they had to erase these regional differences, and, in the words of Henri Grégoire, take people and "melt them into the national mass." The revolutionary government embraced ambitious projects of integration, focused above all on the educational system. It envisaged sending thousands of instructors into the countryside, much as the Roman Catholic Church had earlier sent thousands of missionaries. But, where the missionaries had worked to forge a united faith, the secular instructors would forge a united nation.

The revolutionaries did not have the means to put their projects of integration into practice. But, in the nineteenth century, the aggressively secular Third Republic finally began, as the historian Eugen Weber has put it, to make "peasants into Frenchmen." Local dialects and traditions were turned into harmless folklore, while battalions of earnest schoolmasters instructed their charges in proper speech and in the history and customs of the nation as a whole. Aided by powerful social changes that brought country people into the cities—while extending railroads into the countryside—the projects arguably succeeded. Today, despite earnest efforts by regional militants, most of France's traditional regional languages are moribund.

At the same time, French republicans were expanding their assimilationist ambitions beyond the borders of France itself. In the colonial empire that, by 1900, stretched from Indochina to the Caribbean and covered one-third of the African continent, French administrators, for a time, practiced relatively inclusive policies, providing extensive primary education and even offering citizenship on a limited basis, in keeping with the idea of a French "civilizing mission." Certain parts of the empire were fully annexed to France itself, becoming legally as indistinguishable from the metropole as Hawaii is from the continental United States. These policies consolidated French power over the colonies while also affirming France's position as a center of worldwide culture and civilization. It was a point of pride that so much of the world, in effect, seemed to want to become French.

In the late nineteenth century, therefore, immigrants began arriving in large numbers in a country that already had a century's experience of assimilating people different from the French cultural norm into the "national mass." To be sure, even immigrants from neighboring Catholic countries like Italy experienced considerable resistance at first—but probably no more so than their equivalents in the United States. And, eventually, resistance and prejudice gave way to widespread acceptance, as long as the immigrant groups themselves willingly accepted a new "French" identity and abandoned their old national one. The Third Republic did see moments of vicious hostility to the Jews (notably in the Dreyfus Affair), but it also saw impressive opposition to anti-Semitism, a broad willingness to accept fully "integrated" Jews into French society, and the selection of a Jew, Léon Blum, as prime minister. All in all, the metaphor of the melting pot actually fits France better than the United States, for, in France, ethnic identities melted away far more thoroughly than on this side of the Atlantic.

BUT, JUST AS large-scale immigration from Muslim ex-colonies began in the '60s, this model of integration started to break down. Muslims were not the cause of this collapse. Rather, several developments challenged the republican model at once. First, industrialization and urbanization finally brought about the end of the peasantry, depriving French educators of the traditional objects of their missionary efforts. As late as the 1930s, half the population lived in rural settings, where schoolteachers enjoyed considerable status as agents of urban civilization. With mass migration into the cities, the status of the educational system itself, and its role as a force for integration, diminished noticeably.

Second, decolonization brought the French empire to an end, and it delivered a terrific shock to France's self-image in the process. Large parts of the world, it now appeared, did *not* want to be French—indeed, they were willing to fight not to be French. Those who fought hardest, employing terrorist violence against French civilians, were Algerian revolutionaries (against whom the French state, in turn, employed torture and murder). It was the achievement of Algerian independence in 1962 that marked the symbolic repudiation of France's "civilizing mission" by its intended beneficiaries, and bitter memories of the war stoked racism against North Africans in France itself. (Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the far-right National Front, served in Algeria as a paratrooper.)

In addition, at precisely this sensitive moment came the massive student unrest, widespread rioting, and paralyzing strikes of May 1968. This episode had many dimensions, but the most important was arguably the revolt against the famed French educational system. Students had led earlier French rebellions, but not against their own teachers. One ramification of the revolt was the near-destruction of the magisterial authority formerly enjoyed by French educators and their overweening confidence that they could, and should, squeeze students into national molds of their own devising.

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It was into this changed and diminished France—stripped of its empire, unnerved by the wars of decolonization, deprived of its traditional peasantry, and shaken in its cultural authority—into which the new immigrants from Africa arrived as cheap labor. Even had they come at an earlier time, their integration would have proved far more difficult than that of Italians, Portuguese, or Jews. The cultural differences were greater, as was the sheer extent of the racial and religious prejudice against them. But, in the context of the '60s, they had hardly any chance. The French state simply no longer had the will to apply the older model of integration fully. Instead, for a time, the state held fast to the fiction that the newcomers were mere "guest workers" who would eventually return home. When it became obvious that large numbers of Arabs, Berbers, and black Africans were in France to stay, the state shunted them into bleak suburban housing projects, effectively segregating them far more radically than earlier waves of immigrants.

Two generations have now grown up in these depressing settings, having little connection to their parents' or grandparents' homelands but feeling unwelcome and feared in France. Not only has widespread racism and discrimination persisted—with the new immigrant groups bearing the brunt of France's massive unemployment problem—but the French state has not even done them the compliment of trying particularly hard to assimilate them. Their experience in the schools has not resembled that of earlier immigrants. I have known several French teachers who worked in suburban *lycées* where North African students were the majority. Only one of them saw the assignment as a chance to follow in the footsteps of those teachers who went forth to proselytize for French civilization, and she received precious little institutional support for her beliefs. The others have endured it simply as a purgatory and counted the days until their release.

Those in France now resisting calls for American-style affirmative action claim that to introduce any sort of special treatment for the "immigrants" would be to violate a basic tenet of French republicanism. Everything to them as individuals, nothing to them as ethnic groups, is the familiar message. But the fact is that the republican model has been broken for close to 40 years. For, in practice, it was never simply about the principle of making everyone equal within the civic sphere. It was also about genuine missionary fervor—about taking little Gascons and Normans, little colonial subjects, little Italian and Jewish immigrants, and converting them, in the full meaning of the word, into French men and women. The absence of that sort of fervor in places like Clichy-sous-Bois or Saint-Denis, where some of the worst rioting has occurred, has contributed powerfully to the alienation that has expressed itself in the recent wave of arson and destruction. The very use of the word "immigrants" for these second- and third-generation French youths is an insulting reminder of just how little attention official France has given them. Nicolas Sarkozy is more of an immigrant than many of them.

CAN THE OLD republican fervor be summoned from the ashes? Probably not. For one thing, since the '60s, ethnic groups in France have begun to express themselves far more vigorously than in the past. In the Jewish community, for instance, there have been widespread calls for broader assertions of "communal" identity, causing consternation among those (mostly older) Jews who accepted the bargain offered them by the Republic, going so far as to label themselves not *juifs*, but *israélites*, a term they defined as French citizens of the Jewish faith. Attempts to revive the earlier model of integration with regard to young Arabs and black Africans would now call forth charges of cultural arrogance, Eurocentrism, and racism and meet with widespread resistance.

Yet the riots of the past weeks have made it all too clear that, if the French Republic cannot return to its past, it desperately needs to find some way to offer the youths of the suburbs a meaningful form of integration into broader society—even if that involves some variety of American-style affirmative action. Well before the riots, the Institut d'études politique, Paris's elite college for government and diplomacy, had instituted a program for disadvantaged youths that defined disadvantage by geographic location, rather than race. Such measures could easily be generalized to the other *grandes écoles*. The widespread institution of enterprise zones freed from the burdensome French regulatory apparatus that strangles start-up businesses could also help. (Ironically, the very weight of regulation in France could make such zones particularly effective there.) Just as important, France's leading politicians need to go to the suburban areas and declare, forthrightly, that the people who live there are just as French as Sarkozy—or, for that matter, as Jacques Chirac. Sarkozy's cynical order to deport noncitizens arrested in the riots has sent precisely the wrong message by further associating the suburbs with "foreigners."

Certainly, law and order needs to be reestablished, and the vandals who, after all, preyed mostly on their own communities need to be punished. But the problems of the suburbs call for more inclusive measures, not only for reasons of elementary justice, but also because, in the long run, nihilistic car-burning is hardly the worst threat presented by communities like Clichy-sous-Bois—radical Islamism is. For the moment, Islamist militants have had relatively little success in spreading their own variety of missionary fervor in France. The rioters of the past weeks have shown greater enthusiasm for American "gangsta" rap than for Osama bin Laden. But whether this will remain the case is a different matter. Recent events in the Netherlands—particularly the murder of filmmaker Theo Van Gogh by an Islamist extremist—illustrate how easily Islamist radicalism can gain a foothold in Europe. And it is hard to see better candidates for religious radicalization than the alienated young people of the French suburbs, dismissed as "immigrants" in the land of their own birth. ■

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

STANLEY KAUFFMANN ON FILMS

Marines and Others

SAM MENDES, THE ENGLISH director who made *American Beauty* and *Road to Perdition*, both of them flawed but both craftily handled, has now dared to make an unusual war film. **JARHEAD**, its screenplay by William Broyles Jr., is based on Anthony Swofford's memoir of his life in the Marine Corps. (The title is a nickname for Marines because of their standard haircut.) Beginning in 1989, it has such a story's usual start—recruits being drilled by a human mastiff who shouts at and humiliates the new men. With this stock beginning, we expect the gradual journey into the wartime utilization of this brutal training, along with the union through combat of men who have had troubles among themselves.

JARHEAD
(Universal)

GOOD MORNING, NIGHT
(Wellspring)

Then we remember. These troops are shipped to Saudi Arabia for the Gulf War in which there is very little battle action. (U.S. casualties were slight compared with the number of troops sent there.) Swofford's unit—a platoon of specially trained snipers—spends 175 days in the Saudi desert, in oil well country, and he never fires his rifle until the platoon celebrates the end of the war by shooting at the sky. The daring achievement of *Jarhead* is that it is not a film about war, about combat: it is about being a soldier. Hour follows hour, minute follows minute, and there these men are, living through those hours and minutes. They can't help longing for action, not because they want danger but because they have been heated and tempered, their minds shaped, to an end that has not arrived.

Naturally they fight among themselves, they tease and taunt, they wallow in sex jokes, particularly about one another's girlfriends and wives, they masturbate (a matter emphasized in the voice-over but evident only once), they form friendships and enmities, they sometimes get close to drastic violence among themselves. They have been made experts in violence, and sometimes their stagnancy erupts into something like what they have been taught.

A few have complained that *Jarhead* lacks plot, dynamics that drive it to a conclusion. For me, that it is exactly the point of the picture, its daring. *Jarhead* dramatizes the non-dramatic. It wants us to endure in miniature the lives that these men live in extenso. The film doesn't contend that their situation is anywhere near the trials of combat, but it does contend that merely being a soldier has its ordeals.

Of course this is risky, a two-hour film with no large central action. But Mendes and Broyles have used surges and countersurges among the men to keep the film's Fahrenheit as high as possible. What Mendes couldn't have adapted from Swofford's book, what is his own, is the texture of the film, veritable, solid. He keeps *Jarhead* sweaty in the midst of Swofford's platoon. His cinematographer, Roger Deakins, English and greatly experienced, of course supplied desert sunsets, vast skies, far horizons dotted with burning oil wells, but the men's faces, the intimacies, are equally impressive. Walter Murch, the dean of American film editors, has in a sense choreographed the film's course—masterfully. Jake Gyllenhaal as Swofford is, like the others in his group, immersed in the being of his role. Especially notable is Jamie Foxx as the ramrod staff sergeant of the platoon who thanks God every day that he is in the Corps, placed and purposeful.

At the end we get glimpses of the peacetime jobs to which some of the men return. Do they long to be back in the Marine Corps? This is not implied. But we may draw our own inferences about comparative boredoms.

In 1991 John Frankenheimer made a film called *Year of the Gun* about Americans living in Rome in 1978 at the time of the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro, former prime minister and head of the Christian Democratic Party. The subject was fascinating, the film flaccid. Now Marco Bellochio has treated the Moro subject with much greater intensity and point. Bellochio, who began his career in 1965, has made some of the most trenchant Italian films on political themes, and **GOOD MORNING, NIGHT** is one more of them.

He says he got his title from the first line of an Emily Dickinson poem, "Good Morning—Midnight," and this title is used again on a screenplay that crops up within the film, but the phrase has little relevance to the subject. The story concentrates fiercely on the four members of the Red Brigades who are Moro's captors for almost two months and on Moro himself. Three of the captors are young men, one a young woman. The film begins with the woman and one of the men pretending to be newlyweds as they rent an apartment where Moro will soon be hidden. These two slip off their wedding rings when they are at home—in fact, they are not even lovers. Later this young man absents himself for a while to visit his real girlfriend.

After the kidnapping, the conspirators convey to the government that they will kill Moro if it does not negotiate with them for Moro's release, and negotiation means political issues. This never happens, despite a letter that Moro sends to the Pope. In fact, this letter worsens matters. The Pope asks that the prisoner be released unconditionally, which seals Moro's fate. The captors feel that their hands are forced: denied the negotiations that they want, they must carry out the threatened killing or they will look like weaklings and fools. The three men, primed to the gills with doctrine, never fluctuate in their intent. The woman wavers somewhat, possibly because in her daily job—she deliberately does not absent herself from her librarian's desk—

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she has encountered a young man whose attentions remind her of the world outside. Moro himself becomes an unexpectedly strong figure in the story. (I assume that the role is based on his letters and other documents.) He is never frightened, he never pleads with these people. His chief concern is his family, to whom he writes, especially his grandson who is now only two and to whom he writes separately. If we don't want to call Moro a hero, we can at least say he is a fatalist.

Bellochio has worked in a few dream sequences about Moro in the apartment and at the end, which serve as a kind of "What if" against what actually happened. We do not see the murder. We are told at the end that all four of these Red Brigades people are now serving life sentences. Does Bellochio mean an irony? After they put a man to death, they are sentenced to life.

Bellochio directed with his usual dexterous gravity: what he is doing (he implies) is serious, it matters, and he will prove it to us. He does. All four of the actors who play the captors inhabit their roles with a sense of nativity, including Bellochio's son, Pier Giorgio, as the one who breaks out to see his girl. Moro is played by Roberto Herlitzka whose inner calm in the role is, in a reticent way, very moving. ■

Paul Berman

The Anti-Anti-Americans

France's failures, France's hatreds, and signs of a new look at America.

I.

THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS of four years ago ignited in France a burst of ardent solidarity with America, but also a series of chillier responses, which can be described and classified. There was an onrush of wariness, along traditional Gallic lines—a fear that America, in its wrath, was going to wrap its muscular arms ever more tightly around the world and crush the French under all kinds of new pressures and competition. This kind of worry has plagued the French imagination for centuries, originally in regard to England—a worry that has never been entirely foolish, given the generally downward trajectory of French power and glory. But the ancient worry grew unusually intense after September 11.

This was because, in the estimation of more than a few French observers, America in the modern age had ceased being the benign and generous power that so many people flattered themselves on remembering from the glorious days of Franklin Roosevelt. The signs of America's transformation had already begun to appear during the Clinton years—most horrifyingly, during the struggle against Milosevic's Serbia and the NATO air campaign, which in some people's estimation already suggested an eerie parallel between modern America and Hitlerian Germany. Then Clinton's successor ascended the White House, and everything about the new president, each strange tic and motion—the street thug's swagger, the inability to compose his face into a civil expression, the problem with alcohol, the apparent lack of formal education, and so forth—conjured in Europe the worst of clichés about Texas barbarism.

The new administration made the rather weird decision to do away with diplomatic niceties, except in regard to minor questions, with the result that Washington's dismissal of the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol on gas emissions, and a number of other agreements succeeded in alarming French opinion twice over—first, because the issues in question loomed large in French eyes, but mostly because of something else, which needs to be explained. France during the last sixty years has achieved a gigantic victory, and this has been to make peace with Germany.

A century and a half of catastrophic wars were brought to a pleasant and profitable end—an occasion for quiet joy and perpetual self-congratulation. It is true that, in the euphoria of this achievement, French political thinkers have sometimes gotten carried away and, in their own imaginings, have projected France's diplomatic triumphs upon the world, quite as if every national dispute and fanatical political movement around the globe could be peacefully suppressed, if only governments everywhere would follow the French example and insist relentlessly on patient negotiation and sweet reason. This idea has proved to be a little fanciful, more than once. Still, in Europe itself, France's achievement was undeniable and vast.

But was this achievement guaranteed to endure forevermore? The French did have to wonder. What was likely to happen if Bush's disdain for diplomacy and

THE AMERICAN ENEMY:
THE HISTORY OF FRENCH ANTI-AMERICANISM
By Philippe Roger
Translated by Sharon Bowman
(University of Chicago Press, 518 pp., $35)

L'ANTIAMÉRICANISME:
CRITIQUE D'UN PRÊT-À-PENSER RÉTROGRADE ET CHAUVIN
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his nationalist struttings and his peremptory style ended up establishing a new tone in modern affairs? America wanted to lead, but what if other countries chose to follow? The French knew exactly what would happen. Where Bush's American admirers and even some of his non-admirers merely saw cowboy hats, the French saw lederhosen. And the French—a great many of them—recoiled. I find it hard to believe that anyone with lofty responsibilities in the Bush administration ever appreciated how much damage was done to Franco-American relations by Washington's foreign policy maneuvers in those early months of 2001—by the arrogant air and the rejection of the Kyoto Protocols and all the rest. Or more likely, no one gave a damn, given that nobody in the administration seems to have imagined that someday the United States might need a bit of French solidarity in the Security Council or a few French soldiers on the ground.

THE FRENCH UNEASINESS WITH Bush touched on something else, too, and this is because France's achievement during these last sixty years has been more than foreign. The French put an end to 150 years of war with Germany, and they put an end to 150 years of war with one another, as well—the permanent French civil war that got started in the Revolution of 1789 and continued through the class struggles of 1848 and the Paris Commune and led at last to the triumph of Marshall Pétain and victory for the Nazis. The French put an end to all this by agreeing, in the course of the post–World War II decades, on a grand compromise that was never entirely articulated but was, even so, pretty much fulfilled—the modern French compromise that banned the Catholic Church from playing a central role in politics, and that established a generous welfare state for the oppressed proletariat, and in this manner co-opted the revolutionary left.

Extremist violence, right-wing and left-wing, was erased from the national repertoire, and so was the hope of using the state for extremist ends; and the symbol of this civilized compromise was the abolition, during the presidency of François Mitterrand, of capital punishment—the definitive end of the guillotine and the firing squad, at long last. This achievement, too, led the French sometimes into dreamy illusions about the scale of their own success. The proletariat received its welfare state, but the proletariat in question turned out to be the children and the grandchildren of the proletarians of yore—and not the new immigrants of the 1950s and 1960s, who were shunted into the invisible suburbs and left to their own devices. Nor did the anti-clerical side of the postwar compromise do the immigrants very much good, for if the Catholic Church was by and large pushed out of political life, so was Islam, and the immigrants found themselves prevented from speaking in the only tones that were theirs by birth, which were Muslim tones. And so, the immigrants, left to their own devices, discovered that they had no devices, with the result that—well, the streets have been on fire lately. Nor was the abolition of capital punishment entirely popular.

STILL, FRANCE'S DOMESTIC achievements were genuine, even if the achievements never did penetrate into the suburban housing projects. And from this angle, too, from the perspective of France's domestic peace, the America of George Bush seemed a little worrisome. In America, Christianity had not been pushed out of political life. On the contrary, Christianity in America seemed to have gone insane, with the evangelical sects as principal evidence. Nor was the welfare state looking too healthy in America. The welfare state was shrinking. Nor was capital punishment at an end, in its American version. America seemed poised to execute Mumia Abu-Jumal, who was regarded in France as a famous black leader—a martyr awaiting his martyrdom.

Now, this particular view of American conditions might have looked a little different if the French had kept in mind the peculiarities of American history. In the United States, evangelical sects have always been insane. ("Various forms of religious madness are quite common in the United States," Tocqueville wisely observed.) Even so, Christianity in America has by and large served as democracy's foundation, and not its enemy—which was another of Tocqueville's points. Nor has capital punishment ever played the kind of political role in America that it used to play in France. ("North America," Tocqueville went on to say, "is, I believe, the only region on earth where not a single citizen has been deprived of his life for a political offense for the past fifty years.") As for the welfare state, the French critics had a point, though perhaps it could be argued that jobs, too, have a virtue, and not just jobless benefits.

In any case, instead of looking at these matters from the vantage point of American history, the French observers tended to adopt the vantage point of French history and concluded that America was retreating into the Middle Ages, even if America had never been in the Middle Ages. And since Bush in his vigor and naïveté seemed to be in a missionary mood, the danger arose, or seemed to arise, that America's clericalism, its state violence, and its anti-proletarian biases might, like McDonald's, end up spreading to the European continent, and France's achievements might get undone, and the miserable French past might turn out to be the miserable future.

THESE WERE THE WORRIES. They were scary. And with these purple fears already abloom on the bookstore shelves and in the news kiosks in the early months of 2001, the French watched aghast as, post–September 11, Bush and the Texas barbarians brushed aside the Geneva Conventions and other aspects of normal legality, and the obscurantist Christian bigot John Ashcroft took charge of American law, and the widely predicted American crimes of war did in fact get underway in several parts of the world, quite as if Bush were striding the globe with his six-shooter, dispatching prisoners at random with a cheerful yippee-yi-yo.

The French began to hear about an oppressive political atmosphere in America—the sort of atmosphere in which American magazines and newspapers could shortly expect to be crushed under Washington's iron heel, and political dissidents could expect to be violently suppressed, and power would fall into the hands of a tiny sinister clique. And this most sinister of anti-democratic cabals—who were its members, exactly? Here followed the murmurings about neoconservatism and the heavy hand of Israel on the American steering wheel.

Nor was America's lurch into a post-democratic, ultra-montane, and crypto-Zionist authoritarianism going to bestow upon the world any of the benign effects that might be expected from a

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well-administered dictatorship—a reliable sense of security, for instance. On the contrary! In France a fear arose that, for all of America's bellicosity, expansionism, and savagery, American power was fragile, and the United States was poised to collapse into economic catastrophe and racial mayhem—which meant that if, out of some perverse logic, France felt tempted to cast its lot with Bush's America, any such alliance would prove to be imprudent, and America was going to drag its friends and allies down to defeat. Weakness, not strength, was the ultimate American reality.

This last argument was the theme of a big best-seller in France, *After the Empire*, by Emmanuel Todd, which was translated into languages all over the world—a grimly amusing book to read in these recent weeks of French rioting (the subtitle of Todd's book is *The Breakdown of the American Order*), but all too representative of a certain French estimation of life in faraway benighted America. And so, a great many French people gazed across the Atlantic at Bush and at the raving evangelicals and at the crimes of war, and the French observers began to worry that if America were allowed to run amok, a tide of violence, illegality, and barbarism might steal across the world, and a new Dark Ages might arrive. And this, not anything else, was the greatest danger of our time.

II.

How seriously did people in France cling to these beliefs? Here is a puzzling question. Modern political life is a landscape befogged with mists and clouds of halfway held fugitive opinions—the kind of landscape that allows an intelligent and well-educated person to say with perfect sincerity, "George W. Bush is a fascist and the United States is on the brink of becoming Nazi Germany," and yet allow that same earnest person cheerfully to acknowledge, in the next breath, that, come January 2009, Bush and his entire fascist crew of Zionist conspirators are absolutely guaranteed to vacate the White House in favor of a new and popularly elected team, who might well be Bush's fiercest opponents.

The further away from power someone feels himself to be, the easier it is to wander into these foggy zones of half-believed beliefs, freed of any responsibility to subject any given opinion to the simplest of common-sense tests. In France, even the most sophisticated of people have felt themselves to be located ever further away from the power that is American, and triply so after Bush decided, by abolishing diplomacy, to make a public show of his indifference to French opinion; and this has given a powerful allure to the half-believed beliefs. Nor are the French unusual in this respect, by the way. A fairly astonishing number of serious and prestigious journalists and intellectuals throughout Europe harbor a suspicion right now that, in the age of the possibly crypto-fascist Bush regime, America has turned away from civilization—an opinion that I have heard repeated in one country after another, usually in a tone of sad and anxious concern, the way that someone might express worry about a friend with advanced cancer. And, naturally, there are always professors from America at hand to assure their European colleagues that life in America is sheerest hell, and dissident opinions are about to be crushed under the iron heel, and Bush is a sort of Hugo Chávez, if not far, far worse—just to make these fears seem realistic.

As for the less sophisticated European observers, they have, in a staggering percentage of cases, allowed their own beliefs to wander into fields of purest fantasy that, at some level, every reasonable person knows to be untrue but are, even so, wonderfully amusing and satisfying to uphold, and are therefore irresistible. A writer named Thierry Meyssan came out with a book called *Le 11 Septembre 2001, l'effroyable imposture* (translated into English as *9/11: The big lie*)—which postulates that September 11 was a plot by the FBI and other sinister agents, and that no airplane ever did crash into the Pentagon, and the Jews knew in advance about the World Trade Center. Meyssan's book expresses aspects of the paranoid and anti-Semitic conspiracy theories that sprouted up instantly in large parts of the Muslim world after September 11. It goes without saying that, in the French newspapers, Meyssan was denounced right away as a sort of Holocaust denier. *Libération*, the hip left-wing daily, played an honorable role in this regard.

Even so, Meyssan's ideas received a more respectful attention in some places—for instance, in *Le Monde diplomatique*, which is something like *The Nation* in the United States. An enormous public read Meyssan's book—read it with raised eyebrows, possibly, but read it. A month after publication, the publisher claimed to have sold nearly 200,000 copies, and the book remained number one on the best-seller lists for many weeks. Meyssan's book served as a freaky counterpart to Emmanuel Todd's saner and calmer *After the Empire*, with one of those volumes predicting America's impending doom, and the other denouncing the infinitely sinister quality of America's evil conspiracies, and both books reigning in the bookstores—this, in a country of supremely cultivated book-buyers.

Pierre Rigoulot is a well-known political writer on anti-totalitarian themes (he was a contributor to *The Black Book of Communism* a few years ago), and he has written a biting polemical account of these developments in French opinion called *L'Antiaméricanisme: critique d'un prêt-à-penser rétrograde et chauvin*, or *Anti-Americanism: Critique of a Retrograde and Chauvinist Ready-Made Idea*, in which he cites a truly impressive number of idiotic French estimations of American life. In Rigoulot's judgment, the slightly exaggerated but reasonable worries about America, together with the genuinely distorted and unreasonable interpretations, together with the outright absurdities, all pulled in the same direction, finally had the effect of producing a condition that he describes as a "*pensée unique*."

He means by this the intellectual equivalent of a one-party state, or a "near–North Korean" consensus about the horrors of life in America. The *pensée unique* in France stretched across the political horizon from Jean-Marie Le Pen and the neo-fascist right through the Gaullists and the Socialists to the Communists on the extreme left, and from the respectable intellectuals in the mainstream press to the wide-eyed conspiracy-mongers and screwball anti-Semites—all of whom, right-wingers, centrists, and left-wingers, heartily agreed that Bush's America posed a terrible danger not just to the narrow national interests of France but to civilization.

To be sure, the notion of a *pensée unique* has a distinctly cartoon quality—an impudent spirit of hyperbole in the French style, which Rigoulot tosses at his

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readers in the hope of riling everyone up. One of Rigoulot's other books is called *The Aquariums of Pyongyang: Ten Years in the North Korean Gulag*, which he wrote with the North Korean dissident Kang Chol-Hwan—a book that has attracted attention in the United States chiefly because some Christian evangelicals and George W. Bush have taken it up now that dissident testimonials from totalitarian countries have fallen out of vogue in the New York intellectual magazines. But this is to say that Rigoulot, being an old North Korea hand, knows perfectly that nothing like North Korean conditions afflict the intellectual zones of France.

Last year Rigoulot co-edited, together with the journalist Michel Taubmann, a book called *Irak, An I*, or *Iraq, Year One*, on the Iraq war, with contributions from André Glucksmann, Pascal Bruckner, and quite a few other well-known writers in France, most of whom dissented from French policy and the *pensée unique*, and many of whom went so far as to applaud America's overthrow of Saddam Hussein. And yet, not one of those heretical editors or contributors was dragged in chains to a prisoner's doom in Devil's Island or some other terrible outpost of the French gulag.

EVEN SO, IN WRITING ABOUT AN oppressive and conformist intellectual atmosphere, Rigoulot in his *L'Antiaméricanisme* does describe something real—a pressure on writers and journalists in France to stand firm against American foreign policy and especially against the American campaign to overthrow Saddam. Whatever may be the complaints from American intellectuals and journalists about terrible pressures on them in the United States to conform to the Republican line, I am convinced, from hopping back and forth between France and the United States over these last years, that conformist pressures in France have been decidedly heavier. Rigoulot points out that not a single one of the big daily national or regional newspapers in France, nor any of the TV chains, supported the American overthrow of Saddam—a degree of unanimity that surpassed even the Germans on this issue.

Well-known independent writers were perfectly free to applaud the overthrow, if they wished to do so. But journalists at big institutions and writers who were younger and not so well-established had to think twice about expressing any such view, if only to protect their careers. During the height of the Franco-American crisis over Iraq, no fewer than three reporters at big national newspapers in France confessed to me, each reporter independently of the others, that the demand for conformity was becoming insupportable, and maybe emigration to some foreign land of freedom might be a good idea—which was yet another hyperbolic exaggeration, to be sure, since no one had the slightest intention of emigrating.

Yet these comments expressed the tensions of the moment. Well-known journalists from other European countries, too, have muttered words to the same effect to me during the last couple of years, but I have the impression that pressures in France have been harder to endure than anywhere else. Nor has it been possible to escape these pressures. French schools have begun to teach current events, and one textbook after another (with Hachette's not so bad, others much worse) have taken to presenting the United States in the grimmest of terms—as the principal danger to world peace and even to France, perhaps even a greater danger, readers might conclude, than is posed by jihadi terrorism.

The *pensée unique* ended up generating a giddy feeling of patriotic righteousness in France, and it was the giddiness, I think, that led the French government and sometimes the general population to adopt some very peculiar political positions during the last few years, pretty much without regard to the long-range predictable effects on France's standing in the world. The French did not reap any benefits in Central and Eastern Europe from the eagerness with which Jacques Chirac and Dominique de Villepin, his foreign minister in 2002–2003, lined up with the other members of what was most unfortunately described as the "peace camp"—meaning the Russia of the Chechen genocide and the China that, as Rigoulot points out, had executed 30,000 people during the 1990s. France wanted to lead Europe, and the French giddiness helped, instead, to bring about the collapse in the European consensus.

It was the *pensée unique* that led about a third of the French public to express to pollsters a preference for Saddam's victory over Bush in the war (which, if Saddam's followers do manage to win, as may still happen, would bring about genuine calamities to France). Ultimately the *pensée unique* produced a slightly hysterical opposition to what is called "Anglo-Saxon" culture, and this led a majority of the French public to turn away the advice of their own political elite and to vote against the European constitution last May—a vote that, once again, will probably tell against France's fortunes in the long run and will certainly tell against the immigrant suburbs, where people need jobs more than social benefits. All of which suggests that, in France, the *pensée unique* about America and its evils was never really a logical expression of the national interest, but was, instead, a kind of nervous agitation.

III.

AND YET, FOR ALL THESE many phases of hostility and hysteria about America over the last few years, the French have passed through one additional phase, which Philippe Roger, a cultural historian, describes in his own solid and scholarly book, *The American Enemy: The History of French Anti-Americanism*. This additional phase has been a response by the very people in France who managed not to be drowned beneath the waters of the *pensée unique*—the free-thinking journalists and intellectuals. These people succeeded in launching, in spite of every pressure, a public discussion of the ideological presuppositions that have so weirdly shaped the French discussion of American realities—a new discussion in France, or, at least, a discussion with a wider public than in the past.

And who were these people, the free-thinkers? Roger himself is one of the intellectuals who, back in 1976, figured among the original group of "New Philosophers" in the *Nouvelles littéraires*—the anti-totalitarians of the left, the old '68ers, who managed to persuade huge portions of the French public to re-think their admiration for communism and the Soviet Union. Pierre Rigoulot comes from the same intellectual and political tradition, and likewise Glucksmann, whose most recent book, *Le discours de la haine*, figures in the new French discussion of ideas about the United States. Pascal Bruckner is yet another writer with the same trajectory, and I could cite one or two others, as well. Then again, there is Jean-François Revel, the author of a book that has

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been translated as *Anti-Americanism*—Revel, whose spirit of dissidence antedates the rise of New Philosophy. And there are writers of a much younger generation, born in the 1970s—Barbara Lefebvre and Ève Bonnivard, the authors of *Élèves sous influence*, or *Students under the Influence*, which offers a shrewd and detailed analysis, influenced by Philippe Roger, of anti-American prejudices and assumptions in the current textbooks.

Should we look on these writers as a powerful new school of thought, then—a new wave in French intellectual life, maybe a new phase of the old New Philosophy of thirty years ago? The discussion by these writers of anti-Americanism in France already counts, I think, as the broadest and most thorough conversation about this particular topic that has ever taken place in France—or anywhere else, for that matter. There does seem to be an echo in the general press. *Le Monde* nowadays expresses a more nuanced view of the United States than used to be the case two years ago. *Élèves sous influence* came out just a few weeks ago and seems to be getting a good reception. So, the clouds may be breaking, yes—that is a possibility. And yet there are grounds to be skeptical about the likelihood of any kind of impending over-night shake-up in public opinion or even in elite opinion—grounds to be skeptical not just because the beliefs about America run deep, but also because the whole cluster of these particular doctrines and attitudes is painfully difficult to disentangle and analyze.

WHAT, AFTER ALL, IS THIS amorphous thing, anti-Americanism? A reasonable person might even wonder if such a phenomenon actually exists. In our modern world, hardly anyone outside of the fervid ranks of the most extreme Islamism and movements of that sort will acknowledge harboring any kind of top-to-bottom contempt or hatred for America at all—only a mix of yay and nay on American themes, as with any country and its failures and achievements. Emmanuel Todd, in his *After the Empire*, goes so far as to emphasize that he has an American ancestor, who was Jewish to boot.

Here is our problem, though. If a popular doctrine or bias that could be described as anti-American does, in fact, exist, the doctrine or bias could only resemble, in this respect, racism and anti-Semitism in their modern-day versions—attitudes that not one person with a cosmopolitan or sophisticated outlook will ever acknowledge harboring. Yet if no one admits to holding any such opinions, how can we possibly even begin to identify or to define the attitude in question?

People criticize the United States for all kinds of reasons, and anyone who wanted to provide a definition for anti-Americanism would have to begin by distinguishing very carefully between one criticism and the next—between indisputable criticisms (which nobody could regard as anti-American); and certain kinds of disputable ones (which, no matter how outlandish, might nonetheless be honestly arrived at, betraying no hint of ideological hostility, and therefore should not seem to us anti-American); and criticisms that do, in fact, reflect a hidden system of bias and contempt.

But how to make such distinctions? The task is rendered doubly difficult by a pro-American demagoguery that is always seizing on silly or hateful comments about the United States and using those remarks to dismiss even the most fair-minded and well-intentioned of criticisms, such that anyone who merely glances sideways at a flaw or failing in the United States can end up getting hanged as an avatar of beastly anti-Americanism. In order to make sense of anti-Americanism, we would have to find a reasonably reliable method of sorting out the possible criticisms, and sorting out the criticisms of the criticisms, too—a hugely complicated business, awash in the murks of subjective judgment, where no two people are ever going to agree, nor even any one person, given that everybody has his moods. It is hard to know even how to begin.

PHILIPPE ROGER'S *THE AMERICAN ENEMY* is by far the most substantial and historical-minded of the new books, and it must be said that Roger does know how to begin. He forthrightly asks, does such a thing as anti-Americanism exist? He responds by noting with great precision that, at a minimum, in France people believe that such a thing exists. The word "anti-American," Roger tells us, first came to be used in France sometime around 1948, perhaps as a counterpoint to "anti-Soviet," which was a staple

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

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

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

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of Soviet ideology (designed to dismiss criticisms of the Soviet Union as mere effusions of an illegitimate and irrational bias). "Anti-American" entered the French dictionaries in 1968—the only such "anti" word applied to a country, Roger tells us, though he doesn't say what happened to the word "anti-Soviet." And what did "anti-American" denote—this term whose meaning Sartre once claimed not to understand, but which the traditionally starchy authorities on the French language accepted as a legitimate word?

Roger answers this question still more carefully by observing that, in France, a sharp hostility to America has been more than a reflex, an instinct, a thesis, a snobbism, or even a policy—though each of these elements has played its role. Anti-Americanism in France has been, by Roger's lights, a cultural tradition elaborated by one writer after another over the centuries—a current of thought and literature that has passed through several phases, each of which can be identified and studied, and each of which has deposited a lasting sediment of ideas and images, destined to influence the writers of the next phase. With this notion in mind, Roger sets out to record the history of these phases, as expressed in works of literature, philosophy, journalism, social criticism, and even painting.

Roger is not the first historian to have composed a history of this sort. The earliest important scholar of the literature of anti-Americanism was the Italian historian Antonello Gerbi, whose vivid and densely researched book, *The Dispute of the New World: The History of a Polemic*, published in 1955 and translated into English in 1972, remains marvelously rich and stimulating even today—certainly a source of a good many of Roger's insights, as he acknowledges. A number of American or American-based scholars from different sides of the political spectrum have likewise written on these themes over the years—Henry Steele Commager, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Paul Hollander, and just now Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin (who draw on the original French edition of Roger's book), not to mention Andrei S. Markovits, who published a book in German last year called *Amerika, dich haßt sich's besser (America: Easier to Hate)*. Over the years, the French, too, have composed their histories of anti-Americanism, as in a book called *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism* that was brought out fifteen years ago by Denis Lacorne, Jacques Rupnick, and Marie-France Toinet. But Roger's *The American Enemy* is, of all the books after Gerbi's founding volume, the most thorough, and especially so in regard to the peculiar anti-Americanism that is French.

In Roger's interpretation, as in Gerbi's, the literature of outright hostility to America got started in Paris in the later eighteenth century, and did so as a very odd twist within the history of scientific naturalism. During the first two and a half centuries after Columbus, scientific observations from the Western hemisphere emphasized the diversity of New World natural phenomena—mountains and plains, flora and fauna of many stripes, and so forth. But the Comte de Buffon, an authentically great naturalist, came to picture New World phenomena as a composite, without much variation; and the composite was distinctly dreadful.

Buffon postulated that, in the New World, the Biblical flood had taken place much later than in the Old (which, by the way, is a notion that lingers on in Tocqueville, though he gives the deluvianism a positive spin). And, because the flood had taken place not so long ago, the New World was still a bit soggy. Animals and plants were feebler and less fully developed than in Europe. Trees were stunted. Dogs did not bark. Humans were hermaphroditically less sexual. Men's breasts lactated. Birds sang less melodiously in the New World. (Gerbi believed this was true, by the way, and I suspect that he is right—a point for Buffon.) All of nature degenerated in the disgusting sogginess, and people who came from Europe were bound to degenerate, as well. One of Buffon's influential disciples was the Dutch savant Cornelius De Pauw at the court of Frederick the Great in Berlin (where, in Frederick's time, the court language was French—just to uphold the Frenchness of this analysis), and De Pauw calmly concluded, "A stupid imbecility is the fundamental disposition of all Americans."

All of this strikes us as comic today, except for the part about birds and a worry about imbecility. And yet Buffon, it is said, went about his researches in a spirit that struck other scientists as fair and reasonable. Darwin in the next century openly saluted Buffon, his scientific predecessor. And Buffon's disciples stood in high repute among the champions of the Enlightenment all over Europe. The absurdities, in short, did not seem absurd. Roger reminds us that Jefferson and Franklin, in their debates with the French, devoted themselves principally to refuting the naturalist arguments about American inferiority—this, instead of trying to affirm the virtues of democracy or the possibility of human progress. The naturalist argument occupies a great deal of Jefferson's *Notes on the State of Virginia*, which is one of the reasons why that book tends to be keenly disappointing to modern readers.

Franklin, at a dinner in Paris, asked all the American men to stand up, and likewise all the French men, in order to demonstrate that Americans were taller, not shorter, than the French—which was a devastating refutation of the naturalist theory of biological degeneration, and a genial display of American wit, to boot. But Franklin's dinner is likewise bound to disappoint us. We would prefer to learn what Franklin might have said to his dinner partners on just about any other topic at all. Electricity, for instance; or liberty. Only, what alternative did Jefferson and Franklin have, except to demonstrate at length that, whatever the possibilities for human freedom might be, New World moisture did not stand in the way?

The existence of these debates shows us, at the very least, just how radical and even bizarre was the democratic idea in the late eighteenth century—an idea that ran up against science itself, let alone five thousand years of political wisdom. And the debates suggest how deeply and even unconsciously the leading thinkers in Europe, the lights of the Enlightenment, the best and not the worst in European civilization, recoiled at the new society arising across the ocean.

The next phase of hostility to America, Roger tells us, took shape in the early nineteenth century and was mostly aesthetic—an argument to the effect that people in the United States were coarse in their tastes, gross, impolite, materialistic, and generally not up to the standards of the sophisticated class in Europe. The influential literature on this theme was English, but the English condemnations were taken up by Balzac and Stendhal and other writers, who elaborated these

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themes at length, and did so in books that have had the misfortune (from an American point of view) of proving to be immortally delightful. A few years later Baudelaire worked up some of those same judgments and a few others into very nearly an analytic system, in which American civilization was pictured as soulless, philistine, machine-driven, and inhuman—the kind of society that would pitilessly drive Edgar Allan Poe to his untimely death.

These ideas, Roger tells us, expressed the Romantic disillusionment with the notion of progress. By the mid-nineteenth century, no one believed anymore in the biological inferiority of the New World or in the post-deluvian sogginess, nor did anyone doubt that Americans were piling up hordes of wealth at a spectacular rate. But where in America was art, wit, style, cuisine, and refinement? Progress, if this was progress, was deplorable. And what about its moral costs?

The notion of drawing up a moral balance sheet of America's success led to a fairly early French sympathy for America's victims—for the Indians and the blacks especially (who, in the pages of some of the French writers of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, are presented in a much more human and sympathetic light than in a great deal of American writing from the same period). Then again, the same generous impulse led some of the French writers later on to adopt a curious position on the American Civil War. French national policy in the 1860s favored the Confederacy for pretty much the same reason that British policy did—to prevent the United States from bloating up into a formidable rival, economically and militarily.

A big swath of French public opinion, as Roger presents it, followed the French government on this matter—not out of sympathy for slavery (the French supporters of the South figured that slavery was going to disappear anyway) but out of fear of the aggressive North. And when the aggressive Northerners finally won, the oppressed Southern whites joined the Indians and blacks in the French imagination as one more group of pitiful victims of American progress—to be followed, soon enough, by the oppressed immigrants from Europe who landed on American shores to enter upon their grim new lives of exploitation, persecution, and exclusion.

From yet another French point of view, progress in America appeared in a dreadful light not so much because America mistreated its Indians and blacks and other minority groups as because it produced a population of nothing but minority groups—a population without the organic unity that the French liked to ascribe to themselves: a population with no capability of congealing into a "people," therefore no hope of generating anything as magnificent as the French Revolution. Then again, perhaps a "people" did preside over the United States, and this was the "Anglo-Saxon" people, whom the French racial theorists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries distinguished from the "Germanic" peoples, e.g., the Franks. Germanic peoples showed themselves to be ferocious and community-minded. Anglo-Saxons, by contrast, combined the Germanic vitality with an anti-social cult of the individual, thus leading to a vigorous non-community, something truly appalling. All in all, the United States looked pretty repulsive in its racial makeup, no matter how the racial questions were posed—either because American society was horribly racist against Indians and blacks and other groups; or because American society, in its racial mix, was horribly mongrel; or because Anglo-Saxons ruled the roost, and their racial traits were horrible in still another way.

An anti-government protester, Bobigny, Paris, November 9, 2005

CORENTIN FOHLEN/MAXPPP/LANDOV

BY THE TURN OF THE TWENTIETH century, it had become obvious that America was expanding its power all over the world, just as the European supporters of the old Confederacy had feared; and the sundry racial and cultural factors came to seem frighteningly dynamic. Woodrow Wilson seemed like a scary man, insane, imprisoned by his Christian fanaticism, and manipulated by Jewish financiers. The years that followed Wilson's intervention in France produced, in Roger's account, the high tide of anti-American literature. The United States was a racial horror, a machine-like menace, a disaster for the working class, a tool of the Jewish conspiracy, and so forth—all of which had a way of making America seem much more dangerous than Germany. These attitudes were upheld by people on the extreme right and by a number of independents who were neither right-wing nor left-wing, and, in the age of Pétain, these became the reigning attitudes.

Then again, Pétain's defeat and the catastrophe of the extreme right in France merely ended up producing still another wave of anti-Americanism, this time promoted by the communists, whose left-wing feelings were just as virulent as the old right-wing version. The United States, no longer a greater danger than Nazi Germany, was now the heir to Nazi Germany. "Truman, Hitler's authentic successor" was a communist slogan. The communists campaigned against

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blue jeans, Coca Cola, and Hollywood. The right-wing themes from between the wars were in these ways re-fitted for the postwar left, and the revised themes were massively disseminated.

"The logic of suspicion that took hold in the interwar years," Roger observes,

> would long govern the collective French discourse on America: a sham democracy and insidious totalitarian state. The devil's last trick, as we know, is making people think he does not exist; the same was true for the American "dictatorship." But the French intellectuals were not taken in. Right when fascism was on the rise and Stalinism was being consolidated, it was America they denounced as the great totalitarian Satan. Among the rubble of cold war Europe, half subjected to the Soviet "liberators," it was still in the United States that they uncovered, beneath the patina of formal democracy, the texture of a "true fascism."

In this fashion, a cultural tradition arose in which America was condemned for every possible reason and its opposite—condemned for being less advanced than Europe, which is to say, geographically and sociologically younger; and also for being ahead of Europe in its social development, which is to say, older. America was a country without values; and appallingly moralistic. Repulsive for being racist; and for mixing its races. America's democracy was a failure and a sham; and America was repeatedly said to have lately fallen away from its admirable democratic past. America was governed by a dictatorship of millionaires; or by a rabble of corner grocers. Worse than Hitler; or Hitler's heir; and either way a threat to humanism.

America was frightening because it was excessively powerful; and was repeatedly declared to be on the brink of collapse. America was bellicose; and its soldiers, cowardly. America was hopelessly Christian; and, beginning in the 1920s, America was, even so, dominated by Jews. Coldly calculating; and, at the same time, religiously insane. Talleyrand made the complaint about religious insanity at the very start of the American republic (he had fled to America in 1794 to escape the mass guillotinings that were mandated by France's new religion of the Goddess of Reason) in his witty remark that America featured thirty-two religions and only one dish, which was inedible. The remark about food was significant in itself, and suggested, as well, a larger complaint about the unattractive thinness of America's culture—a main theme of the anti-American accusation. And yet America's greatest danger to the world was also said to be its culture, which, despite its lack of appeal, was dangerously appealing, and was going to crush all other cultures.

IV.

NOBODY HAS DONE AS MUCH as Philippe Roger to lay out these phases of the French animus, or to show how vast has been the literature rehearsing these themes—to demonstrate, in short, that in France such a thing as anti-Americanism does exist and has been expressed in extravagant detail over the centuries. The dictionary compilers who, back in 1968, chose to accord a place for the word "anti-American" in the French language were not mistaken. Roger's account of the anti-American tradition, it must be said, is sometimes a little difficult to slog through—partly because he addresses the educated French reader, which means that, in one passage or another, he presumes a level of French cultural literacy higher than we non-French readers may be able to claim; and partly because his American publishers have banished Roger's clarifying footnotes from the bottom of the page to the back of the book; and partly because Roger's prose gets a little flowery, now and then. "At the turn of the twentieth century," he says not very helpfully, "North America had become the irritating *X* in a socialist equation where the trust was a second variable."

He makes one argument that is unusual in the literature about French anti-Americanism. Most of the commentators on this topic have agreed in according to the French a schizophrenic response to America, in which each expression of French disdain or hatred appears to be balanced or more likely provoked by an excess of love. Roger will have none of this. In his view, the fondness of certain French writers for America's Indians but not for America's non-Indians, or the enthusiasm for America's counterculture but not for the mainstream culture, bespeaks an underlying hostility, and not an ambivalent confusion. "The taste for the American counterculture is anti-Americanism carried on by other means," he says. This has got to be true at times—for instance, in the European mania for Michael Moore, which Barbara Lefebvre and Ève Bonnivard, and Andrei Markovitz all single out in their own books.

STILL, I THINK THERE IS SOMEthing complicated about the French sympathy for the American counterculture. Jean-François Revel, in his capacity as world-trotting journalist, visited the United States in 1969, at the high tide of hippiedom and Black Power and other mass American rebellions against barbering, and Revel was wonderfully smitten by these rebellions and wrote a defense of them called *Neither Marx Nor Jesus*—quite a celebrated book in its day, and for good reason. "The real revolution was taking place not in Cuba but in California," said Revel at the high tide of worldwide Castro-mania. Yet Revel's taste for California hippies has turned out to be the first step in what has become an authentic lifelong passion for America itself, as shown in his new book *Anti-Americanism*.

This book came out in France in 2002 and enjoyed quite a lot of success, even if not on the titanic scale of the books by Thierry Meyssan and Emmanuel Todd. Not one hint of "anti-Americanism carried on by other means," in Roger's phrase, crops up in Revel's pages. A few such hints might even have done Revel's commentary some good, given that his enthusiasm for fending off the anti-Americans has led him to rally around every last indefensible aspect of modern America, down to the Florida vote count in the 2000 presidential election (which Revel cites as proof that America is, in fact, a democracy, on the somewhat flimsy ground that Florida's shenanigans revealed, at least, that elections in America are hotly contested).

In any case, I cannot imagine why so many French writers would bother composing their diatribes against the United States if they were not motivated either by internal doubts, or by the worry that other people in France were succumbing to America's seductions. The eighteenth-century naturalists emphasized the horrible qualities of New World geography precisely because, as I learn from reading Philippe Roger, they wanted to counter an impulse to emigrate

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to the New World that had seized masses of the European population; and because a fad for American styles had simultaneously seized a portion of the Paris aristocracy.

If there is a big flaw in Roger's account of the French animus against America, it is only that his story dribbles to a halt sometime during the early Cold War years, in the heyday of Sartre and de Beauvoir—even if, in a few passages, Roger does fast-forward to September 11 and the Iraq war. I hope that someday Roger will add a second volume to his history, where he might tell us in more detail about the consequences of Charles de Gaulle's alliance with the communists and the usefulness of anti-American ideology for the Gaullist myth of France's victory in World War II, and the role that anti-Americanism has played in keeping the French from looking at their own suburbs and immigrants, and a few other strands of French thinking that lead into our present era of street riots and jihadi terrorists and faraway wars.

Pierre Rigoulot has meanwhile done some of this in his own more modest *L'Antiaméricanisme*, which repeats a good amount of material from Roger (with due acknowledgement) yet also takes up the post–September 11 debates. And, by doing this, Rigoulot manages to demonstrate the over-all accuracy of Roger's main point. This is the recognition that anti-Americanism in France constitutes by now a hoary and well-defined cultural tradition, whose principle arguments and references and tropes took their shape long ago and have remained more or less fixed ever since—a tradition that is perfectly capable of thriving today regardless of strange new circumstances and unprecedented events.

Rigoulot shows this most strikingly by presenting a few comparisons between the extreme right and Vichy arguments from the 1930s and 1940s with the anti-Bush arguments of today. The fear of American aggressiveness, the conviction that America is nonetheless fundamentally weak owing to its racially diverse quality, the conviction that secret Jewish cabals are running American policy, the belief that America is championing a barbarism against French civilization—all of this, which you could pluck from the pages of Meyssan, Todd, and many other writers in present-day France, turns out to be a fully traditional argument, entirely recognizable from the French polemics of long ago against Franklin Roosevelt's America and even against Woodrow Wilson's.

We have not seen anything new in the French antagonism during these last few years. We have seen something antique, and this antiquity, once you are aware of it, is hard to miss. After you have read the chapters in Roger's and Rigoulot's books on the extreme right of the 1930s and the Vichy era, and the chapters on the Stalinists and fellow-travelers of the 1940s, the sight of one more present-day comparison of Bush and Hitler, or of America's evangelical Christianity with Nazism or bin Laden's Islamism, or one more worried concern that America is wending down the tragic path of Weimar Germany, will make your nose wrinkle, as if, merely by turning the pages of a modern French book or newspaper, you have stirred up an ancient dust, which comes floating upward from your reading table in a powdery cloud. Ker-choo!

Rigoulot feels no reluctance to underline the political meaning of all this. He thinks that the French intellectual and political elite, by muttering constantly about the evils of the United States, has rendered itself numb to any of the pricks of conscience that ought to have stimulated France into playing a more responsible role in the world.

> This numbing, this reticence to take action, this refusal to take risks has a name: it is the spirit of Vichy. The spirit of Vichy continues to haunt France despite the defeat of the French state and the expiatory trials conducted during these last years. Vichy is not just complicity with the genocide of the Jews: it is a pacifist and past-oriented vision of the world. And it is above all a refusal to participate in the troubles and misfortunes that are engendered by all resistance and by any pursuit of a "warrior adventure." Vichy is the belief that one can remove oneself from history and from its necessarily tragic dimensions, the belief that one can evoke moral principles in order to avoid combat—yesterday against Nazism, today against radical Islamism. This spirit is stronger than ever.

And Rigoulot goes on: "But Vichy is itself the product of a profounder evil, tied to the terrible consequences of the war of 1914–18, which shaped for decades a mentality increasingly marked by the incapacity to stand up against the adversaries of democracy. They weren't numerous, the resistance fighters of 1940!" Rigoulot doesn't want to go too far with this remark. He explains, "Certainly, the spirit of Vichy, widely spread as it is in French public opinion, does not explain everything. But it is the guarantee that all of the anti-American discourses will find a favorable echo. Above all, in denouncing war. All war."

Those are pretty ferocious remarks. Roger goes even further in the introduction to his *The American Enemy*, where he recalls his experience in New York on September 11. Roger writes that

> French anti-Americanism has of course no direct connection with the aggression committed that day. But in all fairness, those who have been urging the Americans, since 9/11, to "get the message," "learn from the lesson," and, finally, take responsibility for the wound inflicted upon them would be better off doing their own homework and asking themselves to what extent systematic anti-Americanism, French and otherwise, has had a hand in the

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global process of demonization that facilitates slippage from a war of words to a war of the worlds.

Yes, there is an anger in France today. Some of it is directed at the United States, on the most traditional of grounds. And yet, as these quotations show, some of the French anger turns out to be anti-anti-American—an anger expressed by the dissident intellectuals, directed at French traditions and not at modern America. A new sort of anger: lucid, historical-minded, scholarly, critical, and eye-opening.

V.

All this is extremely interesting to see—and yet, as with Jefferson's and Franklin's polemics against Buffon and the Enlightenment naturalists, something about the modern analysis of anti-Americanism is bound to leave us Americans feeling a little disappointed. Partly that is because the French anti-anti-Americans, in their exasperation at the abuse that keeps pouring down on America's poor head, end up going too far in their rejoinders, unto absurdity. Revel's defense of the 2000 election is all too typical in this respect. Rigoulot's bad luck in writing *L'Antiaméricanisme* consisted of completing his manuscript during the two days when Donald Rumsfeld appeared to be a military genius in Iraq—which led Rigoulot to compose a few lines in praise of American military efficiency that make you cringe to read today (and that make Emmanuel Todd's ruminations about America's military weakness look rather prescient). Roger in *The American Enemy* can drive you a little crazy with his re-hashing of one idiotic anti-American French writer after another, some of whom, as he scrupulously acknowledges, never did find much of a public for their books. Glucksmann, in *Le discours de la haine* and other recent writings, goes a bit too far, as I judge it, in supposing George W. Bush's high-flown oratory to be actual American policy.

And so forth—all of which could leave you wondering if the anti-American writers are truly so terribly wrong, after all. Do none of the anti-American writers in France say anything worth the trouble of reading? Is there nothing in the anti-American cultural tradition worth considering? These mischievous thoughts do spring to mind. You glance one more time at the anti-American literature, and sooner or later your gaze is bound to land on one or another accusation that does seem fairly accurate, even acute. And what are we to think of *that*?

One of the opprobrious accusations leveled against the United States in the 1830s was—to take a vivid example—Frances Trollope's observation in *Domestic Manners of the Americans* that, in their plebian grossness, the Americans liked to spit, a disgusting trait of a barbarous democracy. ("I do not like them. I do not like their principles. I do not like their manners. I do not like their opinions," she wrote.) Here, certainly, was an expression of upper-class European snobbery—the sort of contemptuous generalization that has wended its way from the nineteenth century into the larger anti-American tradition, and has therefore contributed to the world's picture of America as boorish and uncivilized.

Yet just now I have been reading Theodore Dreiser's travel writings from 1911, and I see that, several generations after Mrs. Trollope, Dreiser was still writhing under this one terrible accusation, in a guilty recognition that Americans did spit too much. But Dreiser went on to note that, over the years, Americans had begun to expectorate, as he put it, a little less—which is to say, the snobby European accusation had worked a salutary reform in American customs, and sidewalks were cleaner, and social criticism is good, and sock it to us.

Roger in his book cites a number of accusations that make me respond, Dreiser-like, with a rueful feeling that, whatever may be the European biases, certain of those anti-American denunciations touch on something real, and we ought to pay attention and sometimes hang our heads. French writers, Roger explains, have waxed indignant for centuries now over the quality of American city life, sometimes for reasons that will not appeal to us—an outrage at racial mingling, for instance. Céline did not like Jews, and did not like blacks. The Judeo-negroid sidewalks of metropolitan America were not for him.

On the other hand, some of the classic French indignation will strike us as well-directed. Sartre recoiled at the lack of public places in American cities—the lack of French-style cafés, for instance. What halfway intelligent American, having returned from a week of double espressos in the cafés of France, will think that Sartre was wrong? Sartre observed that European cities benefit from a sharp definition of the city limits, as defined by the ancient bulwarks, and American cities suffer from the lack of anything similar. This remark, too, has its truth. Bulwarklessness has done us in. The plazas and promenades of a thousand European towns offer a public warmth and aesthetic joy that hardly anyplace in America can rival—a chilly reality of American life.

Reading Roger's account of these French criticisms, I found myself thinking that if this be anti-American, well, a little of this might help us out no end. But this sort of reaction does not do justice to Roger's larger point. He is not trying to argue that every critical remark uttered about the United States reveals an insidious bias at work. He means to argue only that, in France, a cultural tradition based on irrational hostility to the United States does exist, and draws on many strands, and some of those strands might seem entirely proper and legitimate, if only they could be disentangled from the larger anti-American bias. But not all of those strands can be disentangled.

A current of contempt and fear and even of outright hatred runs through some of these critical lamentations on American cities, and this may be the case even when the criticism, taken by itself, is on the mark. Thus, by 1925—to continue with this theme of French disapproval of American city life—the poet Aragon, as Roger informs us, was already writing, "May America afar crumble with its white buildings." A generation later, in 1948, a writer whom Roger cites had already conjectured in print about the desirability of seeing Manhattan's Wall Street physically destroyed.

Roger might have added that, still later on, as Glucksmann points out, Jean Genet dreamed with pleasure (as shown in one of his essays, published in 1986) of Arabs blowing up New York. And then, in the days after September 11, as Roger reminds us, Jean Baudrillard composed his famous statement on the massacres, reporting what Baudrillard described as "jubilation" at the scene: "the prodigious jubilation in seeing this global superpower destroyed." "Ultimately, they were the ones who did it, but we were the ones who wanted it." These thoughts ran in *Le Monde*, no less.

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Yet what is striking is not the spectacle of Baudrillard himself—a man evidently in the tradition of the fascist dandies of the between-the-wars period, oohing with aesthetic pleasure at the joys of random slaughter—but something else, which Roger points out. This most striking quality is Baudrillard's easy and confident use of the word "we," as in the astonishing remark: "we were the ones who wanted it." Roger comments, "*His* jubilation? He knows better! *Our* jubilation." This, finally, is the scary part—the blasé conviction of a famous cultural figure that, in cheering on the September 11 massacre, he is speaking on behalf of a gigantic collectivity. On behalf of everyone worth mentioning. On behalf of civilization. This is the element of Baudrillard's commentary (and of quite a few other people's, not just in France) that Roger has managed to illumine.

For Baudrillard had good reason, as Roger shows, to suppose that he was speaking for more than himself. Baudrillard's distaste for the American "simulacrum" and the American city and American civilization as a whole and even of Americans as individual human beings was, after all, anything but a curious or idiosyncratic tic. His bizarre and frightening response drew on a genuinely vast literature, going back centuries—drew on the kind of cultural tradition that, in its luxurious amplitude and brilliance, would fill anyone with confidence.

Here we come to the ultimate question in regard to anti-American attitudes. It is one thing to regret the many failings of American life; or to observe all too correctly that France and other European countries are better at doing certain things than we oafish Americans; or to regret any given foreign policy folly in Washington. But how to explain the leap from these discrete complaints into what can only be described as a genuine hatred for America as a whole—the kind of hatred that leaps up all to clearly from Baudrillard's commentary?

The historians will never be able to shed a light on this larger question. The historians can demonstrate patterns of argument, and Roger and Rigoulot have done this brilliantly in their respective books, and even Revel, for all his exasperating defense of more than ought to be defended, has made some useful points. But the historians and the journalists cannot explain, in the end, why so many people would choose to flirt with a genuine hatred—why so many people would choose to revile the United States with an effervescent passion that might bubble up into gleeful jubilation over a massacre. Why anyone would respond with quite that much pleasure might be a psychoanalytic question, but it is, in any case, a philosophical one. This is the question that Glucksmann addresses in his discussion of hatred—his *Le discours de la haine.*

VI.

No writer on earth has been more fired up by the September 11 attacks than Glucksmann. He has produced three books since then—*Dostoievski en Manhattan*, an account of modern nihilism; *Ouest contre ouest*, a mostly political analysis of the post-September 11 situation; and his *Le discours de la haine*, which is the most ambitious and philosophical of these books. His great purpose is to insist that such a thing as hatred does exist—that hatred is a passion capable of standing on its own two feet, without having to lean on anything else. Glucksmann reminds us that, for more than a thousand years, writers from Aeschylus through Seneca to Shakespeare and Racine understood the ferocious independence of hatred—its extreme and irrational paroxysms, its ability to maintain its own strength and even grow, regardless of whatever may have provoked it. But this knowledge has evaporated in the modern centuries. We have ceased to believe in the reality of hatred.

We are all social determinists now. We like to suppose that everything has a material explanation—which is precisely what Aeschylus, Seneca, Shakespeare, and Racine knew was not the case. Today, confronted with the signs and deeds of an uncontrolled and murderous hatred, our first impulse is to go looking for some proximate cause—to assume that, if Medea has gone out of her mind and has slaughtered her children and has burned down the city, there must be some large motivating explanation beyond the unfortunate fact that she is upset at being abandoned by her husband, Jason.

But why should we look for larger motivating explanations? The wildest of hatreds do not need a cause outside of ourselves. This is Glucksmann's point. Hatred's causes may merely be hatred's excuses. We hate because we choose to hate. We could equally choose not to do so. And why choose to hate? On this question, Glucksmann reveals himself as the disciple, as no one could have predicted, of Sartre. In *Anti-Semite and Jew*, Sartre wrote that people who give in to the pleasures of hatred do so because they cannot abide their own frailties. Weakness and imperfection are the human condition. But weakness and imperfection leave us unsatisfied, maybe even disgusted with ourselves. Hatred, however, can make us feel strong. Hatred is thrilling. Hatred is reassuring. When we choose to hate, we discover that, by hating, we overcome our own disappointment at ourselves. We choose to hate because we want to feel the exhilarating vibrations of power instead of weakness, the perfect ideal instead of the imperfect reality. And so, in order to hate, we hold aloft a glorious vision that can never exist: the vision of a perfect mankind unstained by weakness and flaws, a vision of purity

An Electric Horse

(Eugenio Pacelli, later Pius XII)

"The best-informed diplomatist in Berlin,"
a familiar figure at the ministries of the Reich,
he could converse on any subject in several languages.
He loved all animals except for flies,
and these he hated with a peculiar aversion.
He went walking in the *Tiergarten* one day,
tall and elegant in his purple cloak.
He told his housekeeper Sister Pasqualina
that a small boy had asked him if he were Almighty God.
(She did not record the Nuncio's reply.)
His friends once bought him an electric horse
which he installed in private and used to ride
wearing a hacking jacket and jodhpurs,
ascetic by nature and of the deepest piety.

KARL KIRCHWEY

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and power. And we give ourselves over to the satisfying pleasures of hating everyone who stands in the way of the perfect vision.

GLUCKSMANN OFFERS THREE examples of this kind of hatred, and his examples, in their extreme difference from one another, might seem almost whimsical. They are misogyny, or the hatred of women, which is, as he remarks, the very oldest hatred; anti-Semitism, or the hatred of Jews, which can claim a solid two thousand years of history in a recognizable form, which makes it nearly as old; and anti-Americanism, which is the most modern hatred (though, as Roger shows, anti-Americanism does go back a few centuries). Yet these three hatreds are perhaps not so whimsically chosen, after all.

These three hatreds—of women, of Jews, and of Americans—happen to be the three pillars on which modern radical Islamism stands, the hatreds that led Khomeini to launch his Islamist revolution by veiling women and by declaring his jihad against Zionism and the American Great Satan. Glucksmann is not interested in parsing the Islamist ideology, though. He takes up these hatreds in their Western or European version, and he shows that, in this version, the differences between these seemingly disparate hatreds are not so vast as all that.

For why do men hate women? No one ever declares such a hatred. What men speak about, instead, is a perfection of love—a world of the perfect couple, created by the perfect woman, without fault or blemish. And yet, neither the perfect couple nor the perfect woman can ever exist, the human condition being what it is. And so, the more that a man extols a woman's love as the apogee of perfection and bliss, the more his attention focuses on the failings of any given flesh-and-blood woman at hand. And what are these failings, if not the human condition itself—the inability to be perfect? Men rail at women, and even set out to murder women, sometimes in gigantic numbers, as in the classic witch-hunts of Europe. This is always done in the name of a perfection that would surely exist, if only women weren't so damnably imperfect.

In ancient times, as Glucksmann observes, the Jews were hated merely in the way that all peoples are sometimes hated. But for the last two millennia, Jews have been hated also in a special way, which is, once again, always in the name of an all-but-realized human perfection. In the heyday of Christian Europe, the Jews were hated because they alone seemed to ruin the dream of a universal truth: they alone refused to go along with the vision of an ideal society in which everyone would agree on the veracity of the Good News. People hated the Jews out of love for the Gospels—hated the Jews who, by refusing to accept the Good News, embodied the weaknesses and frailties of the human condition.

The era of modern European states got started with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which proposed a newly secular vision of the perfect society—a society in which every state was going to live in tranquility behind its defined borders and respect the borders of every other state. But the Jews scattered themselves (and were scattered) all over Europe, regardless of borders—in plain demonstration, once again, that the vision of universal perfection stood at odds with the human reality. And hatred poured down once again upon the living examples of human imperfection. Today we have moved into a new era, post-Westphalian, in which, now that France and Germany have made their peace, people look on national states no longer as the source of perfection but as the source of evil. Today the fashion is to imagine that a perfect society can only be a global community, superseding the traditional states—an international community in which no one is going to be the enemy of anyone else.

And yet, in the face of this new vision of the perfect world, the Israelis keep on behaving as if they do have enemies, and decline to entrust their fate to their neighbors or to the international community. And so, once again, out of love for an ideal, people end up gazing upon the Israelis, or upon Israel's supporters in other countries, and seeing in those people the horrid sign of the human condition—the retrograde Israelis and their supporters whose behavior attests to the lack of human perfection. And hatred pours down, just as it has always done.

In Glucksmann's picture, the Americans reap a very similar hatred—a hatred that arises out of the desire for the perfect international community that would surely exist, if only the Americans stopped being so aggressively hostile. This desire, in regard to the United States, has passed through two phases in the last sixty years, each time with the same outcome. In the earlier phase, the perfect world was pictured largely in communist terms—a world in which a healthy and prosperous "peace" was imagined as the Soviet goal, and "imperialism" as the American goal.

It was the United States that disrupted this version of a perfect world by pursuing its imperial ambitions—the United States, therefore, that merited a genuine rage, whether in regard to the Korean War (which sparked massive protests in Paris), or fifteen years later in regard to the Vietnam War, or another fifteen years later in regard to Ronald Reagan's arms race against the Soviets. Then communism, having turned out to be the actual example of odious imperialism, collapsed, and a certain kind of left-wing hope evaporated. Even so, a new vision of world peace emerged, and once again the United States loomed as the principle threat.

The perfect society, this time, was pictured as the rueful progeny of Europe's failures of the past—a new international system that arose out of the recognition that Europe needed to come to grips with its own disasters. In this new and modern idea, modesty reigned as the highest of virtues, and a peaceful and prosperous world was pictured as on the brink of emerging, if only everyone would accept the new spirit of ruefulness. And yet, the United States demurred once again, and, after September 11, went about behaving as if global perfection were not at hand, and things ought to be shaken up, and tyrants overthrown.

And so, like the woman whose human qualities mark her as the enemy of amorous bliss, and like the Jew who is imagined as the betrayer of one version after another of the perfect state of grace, the Americans come to be seen as the people who keep destroying the perfect world of peace that would otherwise prevail—the peaceful world that communism claimed for itself long ago, and that, in the post-communist era, is claimed by the rueful opponents of all communist-like projects to re-make the world. And hatred pours down—a hatred in the name of love for a perfect and peaceful world that is actually a hatred for the human condition. A hatred of the imperfect self. Or so argues André Glucksmann.

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

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

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VII.

GLUCKSMANN'S THEORY ABOUT anti-Americanism is more abstract than Roger's, and more limited, given that it applies mostly to the anti-Americanism of the last sixty years, and not to anything from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, though perhaps Glucksmann would argue otherwise. But something about Glucksmann's explanation catches the eye, and it is his emphasis on the contemporary European consciousness of failure. For why is it that, in France, the anti-American cultural tradition has achieved such prestige and prominence over the centuries? Why has France become the world center of anti-American theorizing—the generator of a larger and more virulent literature on this theme than any other country in Europe, or on any other continent, for that matter? Why France, and not, say, Mexico—the largest of the Spanish-speaking countries, which lost half its national territory to American conquest long ago and, even in the present, cannot get through a single day without undergoing visible humiliations at American hands?

Over the centuries, the United States has gone to war and defeated every one of the Western European powers—Britain, Spain, Germany, and Italy—with France the lonely exception. France is the only Western power that America has never opposed in war, the only country around the world for which America has repeatedly sacrificed itself, and on the hugest of scales (though in the literature of French anti-Americanism, as Roger shows, the American sacrifices for France are portrayed as cagey maneuvers to advance narrow material interests). It might even be suspected that French anti-Americanism owes something to the scale of France's debt to America—a theory that many people have suggested, on the psychologically plausible ground that unpayable debts can only arouse unappeasable resentments. (And the same theory in reverse might account for the endless American shock at not being loved in France.) Yet there is something more than a debtor's resentment at work here, which you can see in Roger's history of the French animus.

Roger recalls the history of French grievances against America, the actual hard-fact history—this history that Americans know nothing about and can hardly even imagine, though its stages are easily identified. There was the French feeling of horror and betrayal at the secret Jay Treaty of 1794, in which, despite France's crucial aid during the American Revolution, the United States made peace with the same Great Britain that was, at that very moment, waging war against revolutionary France. It is easy to see that, on this issue, the French had a point—especially so when you recognize that, whatever France's imperial ambitions may have been (namely, to conquer Europe and the Middle East, and to re-name these regions "France"), the French were undergoing a terrible pummeling.

Then came the struggles of the Napoleonic wars, and the French navy seized a great many American ships (a total of 558, by the American reckoning). And the United States demanded compensation afterward, and not in a small amount. President Andrew Jackson pursued this demand, and the French eventually agreed to pay, if only because Jackson threatened to seize French property in the United States. But, as Roger tells us, the argument over compensation to the United States aroused a tremendous anger in France—tremendous because the French had aided the United States in the past, and America ought to have allowed its feeling of gratitude to linger a little longer. And the resentment was owed to something more. For what was the meaning of France's revolutionary and Napoleonic wars?

France suffered. France's army was destroyed. France ended up under European occupation. Huge portions of the French population were killed. The defeat was spectacular and enormous. And here was the United States in the wake of these tragedies, demanding a money transfer from a somber and defeated France to the cheerful shores of a prosperous United States. The French Chamber of Deputies eventually agreed to pay, but their assent was bitter. Even the pro-Americans among them—Roger points to the poet Lamartine, a solid republican with excellent pro-American credentials—burned with resentment. An echo of this turns up, I would add, even in Tocqueville, who remarks that in the American War of Independence, the Americans endured nothing on the scale of French suffering a few years later.

The Franco-American debt crisis in the era of President Jackson (about which I knew nothing at all until I read Roger's book) was re-played in the years after World War I, this time on a bigger scale. The United States demanded repayment of France's debt. And yet the United States, out of an ex-post-facto wish to undo the excesses and errors of the Treaty of Versailles, also gazed in Germany's direction and felt a tender concern, and expressed a willingness to re-structure Germany's obligations. A good many French people viewed this as a ghastly and unjustified American tilt toward Germany. For what had happened to France during the war? Germany had inflicted death on so massive a scale that France could never be the same, afterward. And so the French observed the American policy, and were beside themselves, and, in their anger, composed books like *L'Oncle Shylock*, a classic of the post–World War I anti-American literature, if only for its title.

AFTER WORLD WAR II, THE great French socialist Léon Blum demanded that the Americans treat the French with a little more graciousness and compassion (though he is also blamed in France for having permitted Hollywood's domination of French movie theaters). And the United States, in a fit of atypical sensitivity, acceded to Blum's demand, and not only canceled the war debts but offered the Marshall Plan. In the French psyche, however, the Marshall Plan appears to have come too late, and for reasons that ought to be easily understood. Americans recall the role of France in World War II the way that Pierre Rigoulot does—as something shameful, as the role of a country that barely fought, and surrendered too easily, unlike noble Britain.

And yet, in 1940, when the Germans invaded, the French did fight, for a while. France lost 100,000 soldiers in May and June of that year—a staggering number, and simply unbearable after the losses from World War I. France surrendered in 1940 because it was impossible to fight anymore—surrendered because France had been defeated, not just in those terrible months but in one war after another for nearly a century and a half, and above all in the catastrophe of 1914–1918. French society was simply not going to subject itself to yet another round of mass slaughter.

Anyone who visits Berlin will recognize instantly that Germany is a nation that has suffered stupendous and un-

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bearable defeats—a nation that has been reduced to rubble repeatedly by events, even if the Germans have themselves to blame for some of those events. A visitor to France will come away with no such impression. Rubble, in France? And yet it may be that France, too, is a nation covered with scars—a wounded nation, different from Germany only in France's gallant insistence that it is not a wounded nation. I turn the pages of Roger's history and the other books, and I contemplate Glucksmann's observations about the hatred that arises from a revulsion at one's own weakness, and it occurs to me that, instead of rubble, which the Germans have aplenty, the French possess the very remarkable literature that Roger and the others describe. Not exactly rubble, but a kind of wreckage—the literature of a wounded culture, expressing more than two hundred years of conscious and unconscious injury.

But I don't want to go too far with this observation. France's grandeur is not, after all, entirely an illusion. It may even be a sign of French grandeur today that, at a moment when a more-or-less systematic anti-Americanism has blossomed from right to left all over the world, France has, ever so quietly, made itself the international home of a new literature of anti-anti-Americanism—this new and radical and brilliant literature that has not yet worked a powerful effect around the world, or even on conventional opinion in France, and is certainly not going to produce a sudden shift in outlook, but which, even so, might well turn out to be, in years to come, an event in the history of ideas. A flash of self-awareness. The stirring of an eyeball, breaking through sleep. A new realization, just beginning to awaken. ■

CORRESPONDENCE

continued from page 6

How is it still fair game to caricature the faith of thoughtful Calvinists, and even to attribute terrorism to them?

GEORGE MARSDEN
Granger, Indiana

IN SPECULATING THAT CONTEMPORARY interest in Brown springs from a sense of frustration and impotence on the left, Wilentz concludes that "one ought to be careful about finding some deeper good in terrorist politics of any kind," helping himself to the examples of McVeigh and Osama bin Laden. This over-pat conclusion obscures some important considerations. Was Brown's attack random in its target? No. Was McVeigh's attack directed at actual agents of tyranny? No. Was bin Laden's attack provoked by a universal conception of justice and liberation? No. Wilentz reduces the left's attraction to Brown as part of a "wish for 'vigorous challenges from individuals.' " Furthermore, while his reflections on Brown's success are well-taken, his excursion into moral philosophy obscures the fact that Brown effected much less—and less arbitrary—human suffering in his quest to end slavery than the war that abolitionism eventually necessitated.

ANDREW MARCH
Assistant Professor
Political Theory and Muslim Studies
James Madison College
Michigan State University
East Lansing, Michigan

SEAN WILENTZ RESPONDS:

HAD DAVID REYNOLDS'S BOOK contained some of what he writes in his letter, I would have applauded it more forcefully. His current contention about Brown's alleged importance replicates my review exactly: In the bloody failure at Harpers Ferry, Brown ironically aided the moderate Lincoln's political fortunes. But to extol the terrorist Brown for that paradox is, I think, perverse.

I'm happy to inform Henry Fetter that my new book discusses at length the important Liberty Party of the 1840s, a subject I elided in a review concerned chiefly with the 1850s. George Marsden is, of course, correct: "Merciless" does not accurately convey Calvin's God in all His fullness. But the passing remark in my review aimed only to contrast the angry capriciousness of the Lord invoked by Edwards with the tender mercies of Jesus invoked by the later revivalists of the Second Great Awakening. I reject, as did my review, the ridiculously specious argument that Calvinism was responsible for Brown's mayhem.

Finally, I hope that Andrew March will, on reflection, concede that McVeigh most certainly believed he was attacking "actual agents of tyranny," just as bin Laden believes he is a liberator, and that these fanatical beliefs are ethically significant. I have read many convincing arguments about morally just wars, in which I would include the war against the slaveholders' rebellion. But I have yet to read a persuasive philosophical defense of terrorism.

AT ODDS

TO PROP UP HIS CARICATURE OF MY boss, James Dobson, as a witless member of a conservative "rent-a-mob," Jonathan Chait implies that Washington lobbyist Jack Abramoff manipulated Dobson and Ralph Reed into opposing casino-gambling expansion, while the lobbyist pocketed money from rival tribal-gaming interests ("Crash Test," October 24).

Dobson has long been an outspoken opponent of gambling, having served on the National Gambling Impact Study Commission from 1997 to 1999. He has—on more than one occasion—criticized elected officials from both parties, by name, who line their pockets with gambling profits; and, under his direction, Focus on the Family has opposed gambling expansion in more than 30 states since 1999.

In this and every other area, Dobson's efforts have always been motivated by his principles and convictions, never by political expediency. Nor have Abramoff, Reed, or any other outside party ever directed how and where he focused those efforts. To imply that Dobson is a right-wing stooge shows a frighteningly poor understanding of history. The suggestion is not merely false; it's absurd.

TOM MINNERY
Vice President
Government and Public Policy
Focus on the Family
Colorado Springs, Colorado

LIVING DOCUMENT

ALTHOUGH BRUCE ACKERMAN AND Gordon S. Wood may differ about whether our Constitution is flawed, they seem to agree that it survives only because its spirit and letter inspire people to interpret it ("The Founders Rule!" November 7). This is an important lesson as senators decide on judicial nominees and the political arena fills with rhetoric about what the Constitution really is.

NORMAN RAVITCH
Savannah, Georgia

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WASHINGTON DIARIST

A History of Violence

In the spring of 2003, as the Iraq war got underway, I spent many hours learning about violence in a creaky lecture hall at the Sorbonne. It was a sensitive time to be an American in Paris. "*La guerre*" had made the city's formerly convivial atmosphere heavy and indignant, and I expected my new class—"Shattered Texts," a literature course about the effects of destruction on people and cultures—to be mired in contemporary despair and maybe even hostility. To my surprise, the news of the day was of little analogical interest to my professor. She assigned texts—short stories, novels, film scripts, articles—that chronicled riots and uprisings and protests. Wars raged on the periphery of our reading, but the focus remained on the little insurrections of urban life. Paris, Rome, Johannesburg, Algiers—the battles were in the cities. And it was with a distinctly aesthetic savor that the violence in these works was discussed. Much admiration—and very little compunction—was expressed over the razing of buildings and the toppling of monuments and even the threatening of the second lieutenant's wife. *Yes,* I remember one student saying, *the author has done a good job describing the way the windows broke. But he might have done something more beautiful by throwing rocks himself.*

The recent images out of France's suburbs have returned those Sorbonne lessons to the forefront of my mind. Different rocks, different windows. But violence, and particularly violence as an expression of rebellion, occupies such a distinct place in the French aesthetic that this month's riots can hardly be called anything but, well, French. In France, violence is not merely romanticized—as it is in many cultures, not least ours—it is intellectualized as a legitimate manifestation of philosophical belief. This is linked strongly, of course, to the revolution and to the guillotine, one of the most macabre symbols of freedom ever conceived. But its roots are deeper still, dating back to the Parisian student revolts of 1229, which ended with the young scholars freed from papal law; to Nicolas Poussin's terrifyingly vivid canvasses of the mid-1600s; to Jean Racine's reworking of Greek horrors for the French stage; to the gruesome exposures of the Grand Guignol. In the twentieth century, it was Jean-Paul Sartre who made the tradition modern. Violence, he wrote, is "the beginning of humanity." He does not seem to have mentioned what the end is.

Those rioting these past weeks did not seem to know what the end was, either, but their actions were new iterations of an old tradition. "*La poesie est dans la rue.*" Poetry is in the streets, or so cried the Sorbonne students who, in May of 1968, took to the avenues of the Quartier Latin to overturn trash cans and burn cars after administrators shut down their university. "*Ni doctrine, ni foi, ni loi.*" Neither doctrine, nor faith, nor law, replied the minister of education. To him, the protests were utterly without meaning—which is to say, utterly without basis in any dogma to which respectable people subscribed. But what the minister missed, of course, is that poetry is not a collection of principles; it is an art. And, for the students, so was violence. Sartre asserted the connection plainly: "[V]iolence ... is man recreating himself." But violence itself is not the creation of anything; it is merely the undoing of the old. It is not art; it is desecration. And it works best when its object was formerly sacrosanct. There is no greater reminder of this than France's legions of limbless public statues, the chipped porches and spires of its great cathedrals, most of them defaced in the pursuit of cultural reversal—a new, supposedly egalitarian, art of undoing.

Today, the Sartrian fusion of violence and art also lives on in the paradoxical figure of Michel Houellebecq, a novelist whose latest tome, *La possibilité d'une île* (*The Possibility of an Island*), has just appeared in France. Houellebecq's work chronicles the lives of apathetic French whose days are marked by little more than graphic bouts of violence and despair. He does not share Sartre's politics; his nihilism has no room for totalitarianism, no tolerance for working-class heroes. This is not Sartre's critique of the bourgeoisie; this is a picture of life after the apocalypse of the '60s: Attempts to reorder society and do away with middle-class mores have failed—or at least gone very wrong. (As a character in Houellebecq's second novel speculates, "The serial killers of the 1990s were the spiritual children of the hippies.") And, now, contemporary French must atone for their revolutionary failures through civil service jobs, bland food, and bad sex. It's self-immolation as a form of vandalism. Belief systems of all kinds have no appeal for Houellebecq, and he has gotten himself into trouble for inveighing, in print and in public, against Islam. (In 2002, he was tried in France—and finally acquitted—for blasphemy.) But the novelist and the rioters, many of whom are Muslim, share a common aesthetic. Call it Sartre nouveau: destruction as an incitement to beauty and meaning, violence as an expression of intellect.

In *Le Monde* last week, the young essayist Karim Amellal was one of the few writers to hint at this very French idea underlying the riots. "All violence," he writes, "is in a sense profound ... but strictly speaking, there is nothing to be gained from burning a car." But, he continues, "it is a radical act precisely because the only satisfaction to be gained is in committing it." More than that—it is an ancient, nationalistic radicalism. A French radicalism. And the rioters, like the '68 protesters, like the revolutionaries, have been savvy performers, setting spectacular fires against the night sky and posting pictures of their work on the Internet. They have not just expressed their unhappiness; they have dramatized and promoted it as well. It is the same slippery border between art and violence at which the French have stood before.

Along with Amellal's quietly astute words have appeared other articles and interviews, mostly agonizing over how to fold the "*ghettos ethniques*" into the tricolors. There was much talk of the endemic problems of the "*black-blanc-beur*" communities, of the anger of youth, and of Islam's discontents. Those thousands of smoldering cars and their igniters needed to be integrated into the republic, many said. Few noticed that they were already, in fact, quite French.

KEELIN MCDONELL

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

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

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In the new issue of the Hoover Digest . . .

All Deliberate Speed?

The Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education ruling in 1954 was supposed to improve educational opportunities for minorities. Yet in many ways the educational chasm between minority and nonminority schoolchildren is as great now as it was then.
By Clint Bolick

It seems that, in the 50 years since *Brown,* we have tried almost everything to equalize opportunities: from forced busing to increased spending to reduced class sizes to all manner of educational fads. Nothing has worked until now.

The bright light on the horizon is school choice, in which children from low-income families or in failing public schools can enroll in private schools at public expense. The results from programs in Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Florida suggest that **school choice offers the greatest hope for reducing the racial academic gap**.

School choice offers an educational life preserver, allowing children to leave good schools for better ones. One thing that minority parents, especially economically disadvantaged minority parents, have always lacked is the power to choose the best schools for their children. More-affluent parents have always had that power, which they exercise either by buying homes in areas with good public schools or by sending their children to private schools.

School choice helps level the playing field. It gives low-income families greater power over their children's education. The power to exit poor-performing schools, even if is not always exercised, forces the schools to improve and to focus not on satisfying politicians and special interest groups but on satisfying parents.

The results so far are obvious and impressive. But **massive resistance to school choice today is no less potent and reactionary than massive resistance to desegregation was 50 years ago**. Special interest groups that have a powerful interest in preserving the status quo thwart school choice at every legislative turn and then threaten to undo it in the courts when their efforts fail in the political arena.

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DO NOT COME FROM RIFLES, BUT FROM DEVIANT THOUGHTS AND MISGUIDED INTERPRETATIONS OF OUR GREAT RELIGION AND ITS NOBLE MESSAGE."

– The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz

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- *Arrested more than 800 terrorism suspects resulting in the prevention of over 50 terrorist attacks*
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